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English Literature

The Emptiness of “the Wild”: Gary Snyder’s Eco-Buddhist Deconstruction of “Self” and
“N ature”

chair: William W. Bevis
I begin by reviewing recent critiques of Western philosophical traditions, which have
mapped our contemporary estrangement from the natural world. Following this summary, a
brief comparison of relevant Eastern and Western belief modes is offered, and Gary
Snyder’s lifelong project is then presented as a potentially productive synthesis of Eastern
and Western environmental perspectives. Snyder’s work as a poet and environmental
thinker has asserted certain congruencies between ecological biology, Derridean
deconstruction, and Zen Buddhism. Derrida’s dijférance, the structure of ecological biology,
and the Buddhist non-concept of sunyata (“emptiness”) each contributes to what I define as
Snyder’s eco-Buddhist project, and his unique notion of “the Wild” is the place where these
disciplines and concepts overlap. “The Wild,” as a relatively recent term Snyder
disseminated in his 1990 collection of essays The Practice o f the Wild, does not appear to have a
single fixed meaning for Snyder; rather, it appears to be an open concept or a work in
progress that links together the first forty years of his eco-Buddhist project and that
continues to inform his present curiosities. Within my exploration of this project and of the
concept of “the Wild,” I examine Snyder’s statements of artistic and theoretical intent—as
they appear in his prose work and in the interviews he has given over the years—and I offer
close readings of a broad range of his poetry. Particular attention is paid to Snyder’s long
poem Mountains and Rivers Without End, since it tracks his poetic life over a forty year period.
The paper concludes by questioning the political applicability of Snyder’s vision.
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I.

A PHILOSOPHICAL FRAMEWORK
S T U D E N T : Is it because philosophers ask W hy? A nd
H ow ? That th ey have been unable able to resolve the
problem o f hum an existence?
R O SH I: T heir investigations take them aw ay from
them selves in to the realm o f diversity—this is h ow
philosophers and scientists w ork —whereas the
question “W h o am I?” precipitates yo u in to an
awareness o f you r fundam ental solidarity w ith the
universe.
Student J and Yasutani R oshi, in The Three Pillars o f Ten

Because I severed those so joined, I carry—
A las—m y brain dissevered from its source,
W hich is w ith in m y trunk. A nd thus, in me
O ne sees the law o f counter-penalty.
Bertran de Born, in D an te’s Inferno

In his influential essay, “The Historical Roots of our Ecological Crisis,” Lynn White
Jr. asserts that what people do about their natural environments depends on what they think
about their surroundings. W hite’s essay also claims that the structure of the Western
tradition, which has been largely shaped by Christianity, is antithetical to a harmonious
relationship between humans and their natural environment. In a recent introduction to a
book of eco-philosophical essays, J. Baird Callicott and Roger Ames caricature the criticisms
White and others have aimed at the Judeo-Christian tradition, forming their arguments into a
rough typology:
1) God—the locus of the holy and sacred—transcends nature. ‘
2) N ature is a profane artifact of a divine craftsman-like creator. The essence of
the natural world is informed matter: God divided and ordered an inert, plastic
material—the void/waters/dust or clay.
3) Man exclusively is created in the image of God and is, thus, segregated,
essentially, from the rest of nature.
^F or the purposes o f this essay, I w ish to stay out o f the arguments as to how , and to what extent, “nature” has
been culturally shaped, so references this essay makes to “nature” will typically pertain to the sensuous world
w e tend to think o f as separate or distinct from the human realm. This distinction is similar to the definition of
“nature” G ary Snyder often uses as a com m unicable m odel w ith w hich to re-vision the meaning of the word
itself.

4) Man is given dominion by God over nature.
5) God commands man to subdue nature and multiply himself.
6) The whole cognitive organization of the Judeo-Christian tradition world view is
political and hierarchical: God over man, man over nature—which results in a
moral pecking order or power structure.
7) The image-of-God in man is the ground of man’s intrinsicvalue. Since
nonhuman natural entities lack the divine image, they aremorally
disenfranchised. They have, at best, instrumental value.
8) The theologically based instrumentality of nature is compounded in the later
Judeo-Christian tradition by Aristotelian-Thomistic teleology—rational life is
the telos of nature and hence all the rest of nature exists as a means, a support
system, for rational man. (“Introduction” 3-4)
Callicott and Ames’ summary assimilates many of the major criticisms leveled at Christianity
by environmentalists, philosophers, and those who feel the Judeo-Christian tradition has
largely contributed to the human destruction of the planet. However, to place the vast
weight of the blame for the West’s destruction of the natural environment onto the
shoulders of the Judeo-Christian tradition would be rather simplistic, as it seems the
underlying rationale behind the Western world’s mistreatment of nature has been the preChristian belief that humans and their intelligence are somehow separate from the natural
world. It is only because humans have imagined the natural world to be disconnected from,
and lesser in content to, ourselves that we have been able to treat it as we have. Such a view
of the sensuous world has been primarily institutionalized in the West by the Creek
Presocratic philosophers, whose early subject/object distinctions, which emphasized the
trustworthiness of mind over experience, cleared a path for Plato’s distinction between the
ideal and the ideal’s worldly forms: a metaphysical division that separates the mind from

sensuous experience.^
W ithin this Western philosophical tradition, the distrust of sensuous experience
would later find expression in Descartes’ m ind/body split: close cousin and heir to Plato’s
earlier division. In the West, Descartes’ m ind/body split has created a dualism that
constructed the body like any other object. The body, as a natural entity, then became
describable in atomistic-mechanistic language, while the mind—although contained in
matter—was often thought to exist separately from its physical location. For that reason,
the rational intellect has often been considered a more reliable basis of truth and knowledge
than sensuous experience, and from a Platonic-influenced Christian perspective, the human
soul, residing temporarily in the body, appears otherworldly in nature and destiny. Because
of these two belief lineages (the Judeo-Christian and Pre-Socratic-Platonic-Cartesian),
sensory appearances and sensuous experiences have often been thought to lack eternal value
or unchanging Truth. And as many environmentalists, philosophers, and other thinkers
have become increasingly aware over the last hundred years or so, the world-alienating
valorization of reason over sensuous experience has forced many of those in the Western
world to critically examine this mode of experience in an effort to find alternative ways of
relating to a physical world that has been subdued and damaged.
O ne of the most successful ways to gain perspective on a condition of this sort is to
take an outside view of the situation. With this in mind, a powerful method of critique and

^ A lon g line o f recent philosophers, stretching from at least N ietzsch e to the present, have tried to
dem onstrate h o w this particular distinction betw een the ideal and the ideal’s form s has contributed to the
Western w orld ’s distrust o f sensuous experience and to our consequent estrangement from the sensuous world.
The causes for this estrangement are num erous, however, and m ay include the emergence o f agriculture at the
beginning o f the N eo lith ic period, the adoption o f the H ebrew and G reek alphabets, the developm ent of
form al num bering system s, as w ell as other factors that m ay have been lost w ith tim e (or at least lost to m y
know ledge). A collection o f m any, if not all, o f the above factors has likely com bined to construct the various
w ays in w hich hum ans have com e to distinguish their inner experiences as distinct from their outer sensuous
experiences. B y focusing on the subject/object distinction made by the early Greek philosophers, I have
picked on e manifestation o f this distinction that is overtly dealt w ith by Buddhism and Gary Snyder’s project.

insight the West might apply to itself with regard to the current environmental crisis is to
compare its traditional hierarchical modes of dualistic thought with non-dualistic a modes of
experiencing the world, as are found in the East.
Over this last century, the Western world has undergone immense intellectual
changes due to the general acceptance and institutionalization of modern physics, ecology,
and postmodernist thought, each of which asserts a new worldview more closely aligned
with certain Eastern non-dualistic, process-oriented modes of experiencing the world.
Consequently, the West is undergoing a paradigmatic shift away from its hierarchically
dualistic approach toward a future that is still unclear.^ During this same period, however, a
philosophically heterogeneous East has adopted many Western technologies and ideologies
in an effort to compete with Western nations that have asserted their influence through
imperialistic economies increasingly driven by these technologies. According to Callicott
and Ames, this Eastern adoption of modern technologies, which are embedded in the
Bacon-Newton complex of ideas—science as manipulative power over an inert, material,
mechanical res extensa—\r3& been nothing less than an adoption of the dominant Western
paradigm; “technology,” they assert, “is not culture-neutral any more than it is value-neutral”
(280). It would therefore be presumptuous to assume that an isolated West could approach
an isolated East, as each has been melting into the other for some time now.

) R ejecting epistem ologies that depend o n absolute subject/object distinctions, and stretching back in
intellectual im petus at least as far as the R om antic project to reconcile spirit and matter, nature and human,
conscious and unconscious, intellect and soul, m ost o f what w e w ould call postm odern thought accepts that a
certain inter-relation between subject and object exists. This early Romantic blurring of the division between
subject and object solidified in a scientific and philosophical paradigm shift that occurred in the late 19'** and
early 20'** centuries: H eisenberg’s U ncertainty Principle and an increasing philosophical articulation that all
human know ledge is interpretive helped establish a conceptual framework w hich asserts that the human mind
can claim n o direct, mirror-like knowledge o f the objective w orld, as the object it experiences has already been
structured by the subject and subject’s internal organization. As such, it is com m only understood that humans
cannot k n o w the w orld-itself but rather the world-as-strained-through-perception. This subtle distinction,
how ever, is still far from a Buddhist non-dualistic m ode o f Being, since the belief that the w orld is largely a
construct and that all know ledge is radically interpretive tends to stress the highly cognitive capabilities o f the
hum an being as distinct from the lesser cognitive capabilities o f the animal, natural, world.

Although dramatic distinctions between East and West are currently fading at the
pace of globalization, for the purpose of comparison, certain Eastern non-dualistic traditions
of experiencing the world may be contrasted with Western dualistic philosophical traditions,
offering important insights into the future of a globalized community that is damaging the
planet/ A West fundamentally organized around a hierarchically dualistic, Christian, and
capitalistic system can learn much from certain Eastern, non-dualistic traditions whose core
values, in many ways, m irror the principles of the modern sciences and the values of
contemporary Western philosophies, which are also often at odds with the intrinsic values of
the West’s religio-economic paradigm/
One such non-dualistic tradition of experiencing the world, which has had a sizeable
impact on the mind of the West, is Buddhism. Buddhist texts and thought, in the hands of
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and members of the Theosophical society, began to filter into the
West in the 19'*' century and received a good deal of attention. Yet, as far as this paper is

■*A s Y i Fu Tuan has show n in “Discrepancies Between Environm ental Behavior and Attitude: Examples from
Europe and C hina,” there have existed glaring contradictions between professed ideal and actual practice
regarding environm ental attitudes in the East and the W est. Tuan’s pessimistic assertion that ideal and practice
rarely m eet lies in contradiction to W hite’s claim that practice is formed from ideal. Both theories are rejected
by C allicott and A m es as simplistic; rather, Callicott and A m es assert that societies’ worldviews are tested in a
process o f natural selection as praxis fails or succeeds (279-289). From Snyder’s syncretistic perspective, which
I w ill soon discuss, a m ove tow ard being-the-world (as distinct from a sense o f Being that is separate from the
“outside” world) w ill change both on e’s ideal and o n e’s practice, as ideal and practice coincide w ithin Snyder’s
eco-Buddhist fram ew ork.
5 B y drawing a connection between the Christian tradition, dualisms, and capitalism I do not wish to establish a
causal relation b etw een all three or betw een C hristianity and capitalism, a la Max Weber, as there are many
debatable theories about w hich thought-blocks grew up beside and w ith capitalism (e.g. The Enlightenment,
liberalism, etc). I suggest on ly the interlinking or interweaving of hierarchically dualistic modes of thought, the
Ju deo/C hristian tradition, and capitalism w ith each other. Based upon their historical appearances, it is
tem pting to try to conjecture causality betw een these massive thought-blocks, but this sort o f thinking is
sim plistic and eventually look s back to influencing factors that are b eyond the scope o f recorded human
history. It is therefore rather im possible to trace the origins o f influence on each o f these thought-blocks, and
it is difficult at best, if n ot im possible, to trace the criss-crossing o f these thought-blocks w ith each other. The
conjectural tracing o f causality (the search for sources), particularly w ith regard to ideological fundaments,
seems a traditional W estern enterprise, whereas another perspective on this connection—the Buddhist belief,
for instance, that im permanence is the fundamental truth o f every existence and that everything co-arises with
everything—m ight m ake one less lik ely to search for a stable source, since each source is understood to be
connected to other sources. W ithin such a Buddhist system , the w hole n otion o f source dissolves in a manner
sim ilar to that o f the disassembling w ork o f Jacques Derrida and other deconstructionists.

concerned, Buddhist modes of Being have had little direct influence on the way the West has
approached its separation from nature.* An alternative tradition, however, which has directly
integrated certain Eastern traditions of thought with the problem of the human separation
from the natural environment may be found in the American reception of Buddhist and
H indu beliefs, beginning with the Transcendentalists. When, in the 19'** century, Emerson
attempted to dissolve the self with his transparent eye-ball, or when Whitman similarly
intimated a certain dissolution of “self” in the opening lines of Leaves o f Grass-. “I celebrate
myself, / And what I assume you shall assume, / For every atom belonging to me as good
belongs to you,” an Eastern ideal of non-duality (no subject/object distinction) was sought
in a Romantic effort to bring the individual into unity with God and nature. Largely
emerging out of this American-Romantic tradition—with its emphasis on individualism,
radical forms of social dissent, and the spiritual element of nature worship—the Beat
thinkers of the 1950’s and 60’s (including Alan Watts, Gary Snyder, Jack Kerouac, Alan
Ginsberg, and others) renewed an American intellectual interest in Eastern religions,
particularly the way in which these religions affected one’s approach to his or her natural
environment. And by the time of the Beats—largely through the writings and lectures of
D-T. Suzuki—Zen Buddhism had established itself in the American consciousness as the
most recognizable and influential Eastern religion.^
In his 1967 paper, Lynn White Jr. highlights the importance Zen Buddhist thought
might have as a means with which to critique a West he claims to have been largely

^N ietzsch e’s influence on so-called post-structural and postm odern thought cannot be underestimated, and
because o f this, his ideas have indirectly helped give shape to the current intellectual synthesis of Eastern and
W estern m odes o f Being.
^ For a com prehensive overview o f the transmission o f Buddhism to America, see Rick Fields H ow the Swans
Cam e to the Lake: A N arrative H istory o f Buddhism in Am erica.

dominated by a Christian history of thought. At the same time, he offers a pessimistic
outlook on Zen’s applicability to the West:
The beatniks, who are the basic revolutionaries of our time, show a sound instinct in
their affinity for Zen Buddhism, which conceives of the man-nature relationship as
very nearly the m irror image of the Christian view. Zen, however, is as deeply
conditioned by Asian history as Christianity is by the experience of the West, and I
am dubious of its viability among us. (Callicott and Ames xiv)
In response to W hite’s pessimism, I would argue that contemporary sciences and certain
postmodern discourses have shown themselves to be congruent with, if not friendly toward,
Zen Buddhism’s basic non-dualistic, process-oriented tenets.
The philosophical groundwork, it appears, is laid for a synthesis or integration of
Eastern and Western environmental ideals; however, the Zen Buddhist tradition, like other
Eastern modes of Being, still differs greatly from those modes practiced in the West.* The
West has tended to take dualisms and turn them into binaries that have privileged one half
of the dualism over the other (e.g. man/woman: in this case, man has traditionally been
privileged as a result of Western patriarchy). O n the other hand, the non-dualistic approach
found in Zen Buddhism would deny that any separate phenomenon, such as “man” or
“woman,” could exist, as each term is part of an interrelated unity, while a non-hierarchical
dualistic approach to the m an/w om an binary, as is found in Taoist thought, would stress
that without the concept of woman there could be no concept of man: one half of the binary
cannot exist without the other, they are part and parcel of one another, there is no
privileging. A binary such as the subject/object distinction we make in the West (subject as

* Zen is fundam entally an experiential practice and not an intellectual system. O n ly through practice can one
actually kn ow Zen. A ccording to Shunryu Suzuki in 2en Mind: Beginner’s Mind, “Zen practice is the practice in
w hich w e resume our pure w ay o f life, beyond any gaining idea, and beyond fame and profit. By practice we
just keep our original nature as it is. There is no need to intellectualize about what pure nature is because it is
beyond our intellectual understanding” (124). Rediscovering o n e’s original nature, w hich was always there
according to Zen, is w hat Zen Buddhist practice is. Such an understanding, rediscovered through practice, is
essentially a-intellectual and is based out o f a non-dualistic approach m any W esterners have a difficult tim e
digesting and adapting to.

privileged half) is transcended for the Zen practitioner who is aware that dualisms are nonhierarchical, as in Taoist thought, and are sometimes useful illusions that can be disastrous if
confused with our essential or original nature, which is non-dualistic.^ Zen, like other forms
of Buddhism, asserts the illusion of this distinction by observing that the “I,” the ego from
which the subject / object distinction springs, is merely a construction of the ego-mind.^°
From a Zen standpoint, the mind and body are ineluctably linked.
From these basic distinctions a host of important differences emerge between Zen
Buddhism and Western dualistic modes of Being, as they pertain to a worldview. The
traditional Zen approach to the world perceives a holistic unity rather than atomistic parts.
Zen sees an organic balance, wherein all things in the world are related in processes that
proceed toward balance and harmony, rather than a chaos of disconnected particulars. Also,
Zen perceives a de-centered existence that is without any God to give motion and meaning
to the universe. As embodied in Zen, these Eastern modes of thought, which may have
seemed radical a half-century ago, have already become somewhat mainstream among
Western intelligentsia, and, as it now appears, the principles of modern physics and

^ “Every existence in nature,” says Shunryu Suzuki, “every existence in the human world, every cultural work
that w e create, is som ething w hich was given, or is being given to us, relatively speaking. But as everything is
originally one, w e are, in actuality, giving out everything. M om ent after m om ent w e are creating something,
and this is the joy o f our life. But this T w hich is creating and always giving out som ething is not the ‘small I’;
it is the ‘big I’” (65). Suzuki’s “small I” is here the ego, w hile the “big I” is O neness—the awareness of on e’s
original nature.
A ccording to Shunryu Suzuki in 2en Mind: Beginner’s M ind, “T o stop your m ind does not mean to stop the
activities o f m ind. It means m ind pervades b o d y ” (41). W hen the individual is n o longer identified w ith the
idea o f his or her self, the entire relationship betw een subject and object, know er and k now n, undergoes a
sudden and revolutionary change. It becom es a real relationship, a m utuality in w hich the subject creates the
object just as m uch as the object creates the subject (Watts 120). Thus, w hen the individual no longer feels his
or her self to be independent o f the k now n, he or she no longer stands apart from experience—their self is
nothing other than the totality o f the things for which they are aware. T o quote Shunryu Suzuki again: “When
everything exists w ithin your big mind, all dualistic relationships drop away. There is no distinction between
heaven and earth, man and w om an, teacher and disciple” (44). T he m ind w hich can be observed (the ego) is
n ot the self, because the self is look in g at this supposed self: “If y ou reflect o n yourself, that self is not your
true self any m ore,” says Suzuki (134). The true self or “Zen m ind” is always w ith the things observed. O n e’s
essential nature, or w hat is also called “original nature” by Buddhists, is this non-dualistic seeing and Being.

ecological biology seem highly congruous to the values of many postmodern philosophies
and Buddhism.“
In America, one of the vanguards of this syncretization has been the poet and
environmental philosopher Gary Snyder. Over the last four decades or so, Snyder’s unique
and integrated approach to the environment has helped inspire a contingent of ecologists,
environmental philosophers, scientists, poets, and readers to rethink the West’s approach to
the natural environment and to their modes of Being. Snyder’s poetry and prose work have
attempted to reconnect its readers with their natural environment in an effort that takes the
form of a revived Romanticism, wherein Snyder acts as tribal shaman, cultural mythmaker,
and the voice of the natural realm. Like earlier Romantic endeavors, his project aims to
center Being in the world of nature, yet unlike Romanticism, notions of the divine are absent
from Snyder’s views on nature. And because the language of Zen organizes Snyder’s vision
of nature, nature is not at all what we tend to think of; rather, nature as Snyder conceives of
it, is who we are—it is the entire frame of Being, which manifests itself to Snyder in the
visions of ecological biology and Derridean deconstruction seen through a Zen framework.

n In a recent articulation o f the sim ilarity betw een certain postm odernist discourses and Buddhism, Robert
M agliola, in D errida on the Mend, has argued that Derridean deconstruction shares affinities w ith Nagarjuna’s
M ahayana Buddhism . In particular, M agliola claims that Nagarjuna’s sunyata (“em ptiness”) is Derrida’s
dijférance, and that Derridean trace was previously “tracked” by Nagarjuna’s second century c.e. doctrines (87).
Such an argum ent is o f particular interest, since I w ill try and sh ow h o w the w ork o f Gary Snyder links the
basic tenents o f ecology to the relation between Nagarjuna’s sunyata (a fundament of m any Buddhist schools of
thought, including Zen) and Derridean deconstruction.

n.
DECONSTRUCTION AND SNYDER’S ECO-BUDDHIST VISION
Every thought is also a prison; every heaven is also a prison.
Therefore w e love the p oet, the inventor, w h o in any form ,
w hether in an ode, or in an action, or in looks and behavior, has
yielded us a n ew thought. H e unlocks our chains, and admits us
to a n ew scene.

[ • .. ]
But the quality o f the imagination is to flow , and not to
freeze. T he poet did not stop at the color, or the form , but read
their meaning; neither m ay he rest in this meaning, but he makes
the same objects exponents o f his new thought. H ere is the
difference betw een the p oet and the m ystic, that the last nails a
sym bol to one sense, w h ich was a true sense for a m om ent, but
soon becom es old and false. For all sym bols are fluxional; all
language is vehicular and transitive, and is good, as ferries and
horses are, for conveyance, not as farms and houses are, for
hom estead.
Ralph W aldo E m erson, “The P oet”

Snyder has been criticized by many postmodernists for the increasingly didactic
character of his recent poetry, which clearly attempts to communicate a discernable
“meaning,” yet because of the Buddhist approach he takes—in particular, his use of what
Buddhists call “emptiness”—the ideologies he presents suggest the peeling away of
ideologies. Zen Buddhism teaches of “emptiness awareness,” which is the clearing away of
all subjective intentions, habits, and fixed or preconceived ideas, as a critical component to
the experience of enlightenment.'^ And within Snyder’s oeuvre, reported experiences of
emptiness by both the poet and the speaking voices in his poetry work to deny fixed
conceptions or ideas.
Although there are those who might argue that the experience of emptiness arising
from non-dualism is itself an ideology that has the ability to oppress, emptiness awareness is

*2 “E m ptiness” is a non-concept in the sense that this awareness frees the individual o f their o f subjective
intentions, habits, fixed or preconceived ideas about the w orld. A ll “things,” w ithin an emptiness awareness,
are not “thin gs” as w e often think o f them (as nouns); rather, they appear to be part o f a non-dualistic and
totalizing awareness o f existence.

10

an open experience. It is a process of denying fixed conceptions or ideas, or as the Buddhist
saying goes, “If you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him.” Emerson, using the metaphor
of a conversation, similarly de-centers ideologies through a valorization of openness in his
essay “Circles”:
W hen each new speaker strikes a new light, emancipates us from the oppression of
the last speaker, to oppress us with the greatness and exclusiveness of his own
thought, then yields us to another redeemer, we seem to recover our rights, to
become men. (408)
For Emerson, like Snyder, the transitory character of ideologies reveals the impermanent
nature of existence: “There are no fixtures in nature,” Emerson says “The universe is fluid
and volatile. Permanence is but a word of degrees” (403). This continual process of peeling
away ideologies is not unlike what deconstruction does.^^ As Snyder says in a 1992
interview.
The intellectual energy represented by “deconstruction” is potentially a very good
one. Divorce it from the intimidating mystification and narrowness of its political
agenda and put it in Mahayana terms, which would be “Deconstruction for all
Sentient Beings,” not just deconstruction for alienated European intellectuals! Then
it becomes very much a Buddhist exercise, always remembering that deconstruction
means the deconstructing of constructions and the constructions are official
mythologies, the official mythologies of occidental institutions for example. So to
talk about the role of prehistory in determining the larger history of Japan is a
deconstructive exercise. Getting to roots is a deconstructive exercise. And then
questioning the meaning of roots is a further deconstructive exercise! (Rossiter and
Evans 12)
Because mythologies, and the ideologies they often become, reflect the changing
relationships cultures have with their natural environments—they cannot be fixed or

D econstruction, b y the very nature o f its logic, deconstructs its ow n meaning, and in doing so validates the
stripping aw ay o f beliefs as a n ew center o f meaning. This deconstructed construction o f meaning is for that
reason comparable to a Buddhist awareness o f impermanence. In other words, according to Buddhism, there
is on ly the constant flux o f phenom ena, wherein no stable center can ever be located, and because of this, fixed
conceptions or ideas about the entire phenom enal universe d on ’t m atch up w ith the experience of
im perm anence. T o have an awareness that is congruent to impermanence then, one must learn to go beyond
fixed con ception s and ideas—one m ust learn to have an em pty m ind. This Zen Buddhist perspective,
however, represents the construction o f a center, w hich, because it operates on logic similar to deconstruction,
m ust eventually deconstruct its ow n m eaning and therefore participate in its ow n reality: impermanence.
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stable—and because there is the possibility of infinite skepticism inherent in the continual
deconstruction of mythologies and ideologies, Snyder asserts that if the deconstructive
exercise is “tied to the Bodhisattva’s vow, which is to work on behalf of all beings,” then it is
not an infinitely receding skepticism; rather “[i]t has a pragmatic aspect, which is: at what
point do we benefit other beings?” (Rossiter and Evans 12).
Snyder’s attempt to re-create a sense of wholeness and interdependence with the
sensuous world through a continual deconstructive effort, which he connects in the above
interview with the Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna’s dialect of emptiness, is like the healing
song of the traditional shaman who is always working on behalf of all beings. “Poetry,”
Snyder writes, “within the civilized area of history is the fragmented attempt to recreate a
‘healing song’ aspect of the shaman’s practice” {RW 175).
Language, which has been perceived by Lacan and other postmodern theorists to act
as a barrier to this healing process, becomes for Snyder the method by which he attempts to
heal the split between the abstraction of how humans perceive Being and their “original
nature,” which is nothing more or less than nature. As a poet, using language as his medium,
Snyder says that he is always “steering a course between crystal clouds of utterly
incommunicable nonverbal states—and the gleaming daggers and glittering nets of
language” {GSR 53). The “nonverbal states” Snyder refers to are non-linguistic moments of
emptiness awareness, while “the gleaming daggers and glittering nets of language” overtly
refers to language as the Jewel N et of Indra.'''
In Hua-yen Buddhist literature, the Jewel Net of Indra is located within the heavenly
palace of the god Indra and is a net of infinite dimension decorated with a single round jewel
at each knot of the net. When one inspects a certain individual jewel in this net, he or she
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will find within it a hall of mirrors reflecting all the other jewels. All the other jewels of the
net act similarly, so that each jewel contains all the other jewels. Since any one jewel, along
with all the other reflections in it, is reflected in each of the other jewels, an interpenetrative
and reflective infinity is represented. All of this reflectivity happens simultaneously and
without sequential order; thus, the association of language with the Jewel Net of Indra
indicates that signs are jewels in the net of language. According to Ferdinand de Saussure
this is true, as each sign is dependent upon other signs for its meaning. Each sign’s meaning
is therefore contingent upon the whole language net for meaning, since every sign is
dependent upon other signs for its existence, thus there can be no true sense of signs
deferring to other signs. This sort of logic, of course, correlates with Derrida’s notion of
dijférance, in which, because each sign is what it is by not being the others, and every sign
involves the others, meaning (read “center” or “source”) is infinitely deferred, and key
philosophical dualisms, such as reality/appearance, being/nothingness, reason/unreason,
and knowledge/ignorance, deconstruct themselves. In this Buddhist and deconstructionist
logic, language is holistically structured just like an ecosystem, as all creatures are dependent
upon other creatures for their existence, and each ecosystem is dependent upon other
ecosystems for its survival and vice versa.

From this perspective, what I would call an

“eco-Buddhist” position, both language and humans cannot be thought of as outside of
nature, since to do so would deny our mutual dependency upon other forms of life, while it

States o f em ptiness awareness are necessarily non-linguistic, since to be aware o f a w ord is to have a fixed,
therefore closed, conception o f the nature o f the signifier’s signified or the signifier’s possible physical referent.
M y attempt to relate the logic o f ecology and deconstruction to Buddhist logic does not equate an ecological
and deconstructive sense o f w holeness w ith a Buddhist awareness o f wholeness. The wholeness perceived as a
result o f ecological and deconstructive logic is a cognitive perception o f that analysis, expressed through
language, w h ile during a Buddhist awareness o f w holeness, cortical processing is largely suspended, and the
awareness is non-verbal. A lthough Snyder’s project links ecological and deconstructive logic to Buddhist logic,
the awareness o f w holeness he speaks of, w hich is clearly Buddhist in character, cannot therefore be
experienced logically.
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would also construct a dualism that would privilege humans above other forms of lifed^
Here again we see the overlap of Buddhist thinking and Derridean deconstruction, this time
combined with ecological biology to suggest a radically interdependent vision wherein
seemingly disparate ways of thinking add to larger wholed^

T he necessary ethics o f to h ow to live a life in a w orld where no human life is valued above other forms of
life is an issue that is still w id ely discussed amongst Buddhists. It is also an issue that stretches w ell beyond the
scope o f this paper; however, a mainstream Buddhist response to this issue w ould assert that one should do the
least harm possible in all aspects o f his or her existence.
T he very dissem ination o f Zen ideology into language, w hich—from a deconstructive-Jewel-net-ecosystem
perspective—is representative o f interrelatedness, indicates that meaning is given by those w h o read Snyder’s
texts and also by the w orld that envelops those w h o read the texts, not the other w ay around. Included in this
de-centered approach, experiences o f em ptiness, w hich Snyder’s p oetry and prose seem to offer as a key to
m om ents o f emptiness awareness, are participated in by various individuals through various forms of religious
and secular experiences. These cross-cultural experiences o f a Buddhist awareness indicate Snyder’s belief in
the cross-cultural and pan-religious nature o f em ptiness. A s evidence o f this, I w ill later show how , in the
poem “The Hump-backed Flute Player,” a historical Native American, a mythical Native American character, a
Buddhist scholar-pilgrim, and the speaker o f the poem all carry experiences o f em ptiness w ith them.
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m.
INTERRELATEDNESS AND SNYDER’S SYNCRETISTIC METHOD
T he traditional or tribal shaman [...] acts as an interm ediary
betw een the hum an com m u n ity and the larger ecological field,
ensuring that there is an appropriate flow o f nourishm ent not
just from the landscape to the hum an inhabitants, but from the
hum an co m m u n ity back to the local earth [...] T he shaman or
sorcerer is the exem plary voyager in the interm ediate realm
between the human and more-than-human worlds, the primary
strategist and negotiator in any dealings w ith the O thers.
D avid Abram s, The Spell o f the Sensuous

Although I will use the Zen (non) concept of emptiness as a fundamental structuring
key with which to unlock Snyder’s project and organize a cohesive reading of it, I want to
stress that there can be no causal starting point at which to locate Snyder’s ideological roots.
Because Snyder’s poetry and prose often point to emptiness awareness as allowing for the
experience of non-dualistic moments of unity, there can be no single ideology behind
Snyder’s project except the ideology of denying fixed ideas or fixed conceptions. As I
believe Snyder would see it, to take a Zen perspective is to take an interrelated perspective
toward every idea, intellectual discipline, object of study, or any other “separate” noun of
which one can conceive. Zen Buddhism is not the only starting point from which to
understand Snyder; rather, it is just one of the many ways with which to enter into the
radically integrated scope of his vision. In order to begin to see the unusual place Snyder is
coming from, the critic must see that all of Snyder’s influences are part of a vision of
existence that is you-me-Snyder-the-world.
Salman Rushdie’s protagonist in Midnight’s Children makes a statement to the reader
which seems to encapsulate this personal sense of interconnectedness with space and time:
W ho What am I? My answer: I am the sum total of everything that went before me,
of all that have been seen done, of everything done-to-me. I am everyone everything
whose being-in-the-world affected was affected by mine. I am anything that
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happens after I’ve gone which would not have happened if I had not come...To
understand me, you’ll have to swallow the world. (440-441)
In order to swallow Snyder then, one must swallow interrelatedness or interconnectedness,
because to Snyder, “nothing is not related [...] everything is interrelated [...] there really are
no fragments” {Towards 133).
From a similar Zen viewpoint, in order to understand anything you must not try to
understand everything, for that is impossible; rather, in order to understand everything one
must understand one thing: the self.

According to Zen, to understand one’s original, non-

dualistic self is to understand the essential nature of everything: notions of an isolated “self”
and all other fixed conceptions are abstractions that draw us away from our essential or
original nature, which is interrelated, interconnected or knotted with everything else. Such a
holistic Zen perspective acts as the fundament of Snyder’s syncretized approach, and is
primarily drawn from his years studying Zen in Japan, and his work as a logger,
environmental thinker, teacher, prose writer, and poet.
In a 1973 interview, Snyder uses Buddhist terminology to express this sense of
interconnectedness that often manifests itself in his poetry:
I find it always exciting to me, beautiful, to experience the interdependencies of
things, the complex webs and networks by which everything moves, which I think
are the most beautiful awarenesses that we can have of ourselves and of our planet.
Let me quote something:
The Buddha once said, Bhikshus (monks), if you can understand this blade
of rice, you can understand the laws of interdependence and origination. If
you can understand the laws of interdependence and origination, you can
A ccording to Shunryu Suzuki, in 2en Mind: Beginner’s Mind, “Each one o f us must make his ow n true way,
and w hen w e do, that w ay w ill express the universal w ay [...] W hen y o u understand one thing through and
through you understand everything. W hen you try to imderstand everything, you will not understand anything.
T he best w ay is to understand yourself, and then you w ill understand everything” (111). This understanding of
self is attained through an em pty m ind—one that is free from fixed ideas or conceptions about the w orld and
existence: “U nderstanding,” Suzuki says, “w ill com e out o f em ptiness” (111). T he w ord “Understanding” is
n ot used by Suzuki to refer to an intellectual grasping but rather it refers to a non-dualistic awareness, which is
often called “Zen m ind,” “big m ind,” or “m ind o f em ptiness” by Zen practitioners. This Zen m ind contains
all o f existence and non-existence in a non-dualistic fram ew ork o f “a n d /is” logic that functions between
polarities o f presence/absence, real/unreal, nature/culture, etc.
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understand the Dharma. If you understand the Dharma, you know the
Buddha.
A nd again, that’s one of the worlds that poetry has taken, is these networks, these
laws of interdependence [...] imagination, intuition, vision, clarify them [laws of
interdependence], manifest them in certain ways—and to be able to transmit that to
others is to transmit a certain quality of truth about the world. { R W 35)
This interpenetrating, interdependent framework of Being expressed by the Buddha
transmits the Dharma—a. word that has no one general meaning, but which is often
translated as “truth,” “righteousness,” “essence,” “doctrine,” “n a t u r e . A s Snyder
succinctly says of the Dharma expressed by each dharma, in a style harking back to Whitman’s
world-embracing vision in Leaves o f Grass,
[...] a great poet does not express his or her self, he expresses all of our selves. And
to express all of our selves you have to go beyond your own self. Like Dôgen, the
Zen master, said, “We study the self to forget the self. And when you forget the self,
you become one with all things.” And that’s why poetry’s not self-expression in those
small self terms. {R W 65)
The above quote is also another way of saying what the Buddhist teacher Chin-k’ai says
about expressing the relationship between the mind and dharmas: “All one can say is that the

In Buddhism , the term dharm a has other connotations as w ell. Phenom ena in general, as opposed to
noum ena, are dharmas, as are the qualities and characteristics o f phenomena. A ll qualities and characteristics of
dharmas are also composite. In The Buddhist Tradition: in India, China, andJapan, A.L. Basham explains that “As a
corollary o f the fact that all things are com posite th ey are transient, for the com p osition o f all aggregates is
liable to change w ith tim e. M oreover, being essentially transient, they have no Self or soul, no abiding
individuality” (10). A ll phenom ena (A^ztwas) are thus com posite and transient according to Buddhism. That
th ey have n o Self or soul can n ot o n ly be ascribed to the fact that a stable self is an unreality, but also to the
belief in the dependent origination o f things. A ccording to Shu-chun H uang, in “A Hua-Yen Buddhist
Perspective on Gary Snyder,” the Law o f D ependent O rigination (the Buddhist w ay o f accounting for the
cause o f existence, w hich is also k n ow n as the Law o f Co-origination) asserts that all phenom ena are relative
and dependent upon other phenom ena for their Being (197). “Subjectively,” H uang says, “each dharma does
possess a form o f its ow n. A dharma is em pty in the sense that, objectively, it is ‘w ithout a self-essence’ and its
‘existence’ is com posed o f elem ents w hich disintegrate” (197). "Sunyata, or em ptiness,” he elaborates, “is not
equivalent to non-existence but is w ith ou t an independent existence, for all dharmas are dependent upon
causation. [...] From this view p oin t, all dharmas are sunya (empty), and hence dependent. For example, the
thing w e denom inate as a flow er is an existence made up o f constituent elem ents such as seed, sunlight, air,
water, and so on. The existence o f the flow er is a ‘pseudo being,’ dependent u pon the cooperation o f those
conditions, and each condition per se is still a ‘pseudo being’ com posed o f other constituent elements. For
instance, w ater can be disintegrated in to H 2 and O ” (197). In this m anner the Buddhist m axim “form is
emptiness; emptiness is form ” begins to m ake sense. A nd it is in this manner that dharmas express the Dharma.
T o frame this thought non-dualistically, Shunryu Suzuki says in le n Mind: Beginner’s M ind, “Each existence
depends o n som ething else. Strictly speaking, there are no separate individual existences. There are just many
names for on e existence” (119).
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Mind is all dharmas and that all dharmas are the Mind. [...] Knowledge cannot know it, nor
can words speak it” (Hurvitz, et al. 166). In The Practice of the Wild, Snyder offers yet another
expression of this sentiment: “When humans know themselves, the rest of nature is right
there. This is what the Buddhists call the Dharma” (68).
As Snyder’s Romantic quote about a “great poet” indicates, he feels that the job of
his poetry is to paradoxically communicate a non-linguistic, non-intellectual, non-dualistic
sense of existence through language. When asked in an 1990 interview to say something
about what seems to be the paradox of composing a Zen poem—how to give expression to
an experience that the interviewer perceives to be pre-symbolic and pre-verbal [Martin
165]—Snyder responded:
[...] in Zen we find that that which cannot be said is not complete. If you have an
understanding and cannot express it, then your understanding is not yet complete.
The act of expressing clarifies your understanding of it. However, the nature of that
expression may not be clear and transparent to everybody, which is why Zen
literature is not easy to follow. But that’s what it is. So the person who has a Zen
eye can understand it. (Martin 166)
This question and answer deals specifically with Zen poetry, and it would seem not all of
Snyder’s poetry is Zen poetry, as many of his poems are overtly political and often deal with
subjects that do not seem to reflect Zen beliefs, yet his vision of the world is often expressed
through Zen terminology. In a rather revealing statement, Snyder uses distinctively Zen
terminology to describe his poetic task:
The work of poetry is really not the w ork of prophecy. N or is it, ultimately, the
w ork of social change. That’s just part of it. The other part of it is in the eternity of
the present, and doesn’t have to do with evolutionary processes at all, but has to do
with bringing us back to our original, true natures from whatever habit-molds that our
perceptions, that our thinking and feeling get formed into. And bringing us back to
original true mind, seeing the universe freshly in eternity, yet at any moment. {R WIT,
italics added)
Snyder’s attention to the present moment is typically Zen, and the mixing together of the
terms “original, true nature” and “original mind” is a way to refer to the same “original
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nature” of Zen Buddhism, which involves the seeing “freshly” or mindfully free of “habitmolds” (preconceived or fixed ideas) and the getting forever-lost-in-eternity-always-present.
In the above quote, our “original mind” is an emptied awareness; it is the experience of
seeing free of subjective intentions, or preconceived and fixed ideas. If the work of Snyder’s
poetry is to “[bring] us back to original true mind,” then Snyder’s poetry points, however
indirectly, to the experience of emptiness as revealing our original nature.
Because our original nature is non-dualistic, the awareness of it is not nameable in
the sense that it can be made a noun—since to name it as such would be to constitute it as a
thing, which it both is and is not. The naming of original nature cannot mean in the typical
sense, as the meaning it intends lies outside the enclosure of a noun; hence, Snyder and other
Buddhists often refer to this non-dualistic Absolute as “emptiness” or “the Void”: the
“Nothing that is not there and the nothing that is” which Wallace Stevens’ “The Snow Man”
seems to behold.^° The experience of emptiness refers to a non-dualistic state of Being that
both is (in the sense of acting as a thing) and isn’t (in the sense of not acting as a thing),
because the categories “is” and “isn’t ” are dualistic assertions that are extrinsic to the
experience of original mind. As a result of this linguistic constraint, much of Snyder’s poetry
typically points to a reality many Westerners have difficulty grasping at a conceptual level,
and because of this pointing, the poetry often appears to be quite didactic, as it actively
points to and espouses a worldview.
W ith this type of poetics in mind, one might playfully label Snyder a “Zen shaman,”
as the shaman’s traditional role in his or her society was to act as intermediary for the
exchanges between the human and the natural, or what Snyder calls the “extra-human

zo For an intriguing inquiry into the influence Eastern states o f m ind had on m any of Wallace Stevens’ poems,
including the “The Snow Man,” see William W . Bevis’ M ind o f Winter: Wallace Stevens, Meditation, and Literature.
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realms” {Towards 110)/^ The eco-philosopher David Abrams, working along similar lines,
calls these realms the “more-than-human world” in The Spell o f the Sensuous, his book
chronicling the role written language has played in abstracting humans from their sensual
environment. Yet it is through written language—what Abrams finds to be a central source
of our estrangement from nature—that Snyder’s poetry and prose attempts to bridge the gap
between the human and natural world via an eco-Buddhist rejection of this gap.
In a statement indicating the biocentric view on human affairs he takes, Snyder, in a
1972 interview with Ekbert Faas, claimed that his ideas primarily stem from his readings on
biology. This assertion, however, along with other biocentric statements Snyder has made,
in no way deny the radically interrelated, interconnected vision of the world his work seems
to present. Snyder’s readings on ecological biology, in particular, suggest fundamental
congruencies between Buddhism and the biological sciences. As he said in the same
interview, “I’m committed to a biological Buddhist mystic defense of the diversity of life
which I think is the w ork of the poets as ancient shaman-poets and ancient servants of the
Muse and the lady of wild things and non-human or extra-human realms” {Towards 110).

This rather new-age label o f “Zen shaman” is not meant to m ock Snyder, as he is often considered to be the
original shaman-song poet w hose syncretistic style other poets have imitated, often garnering negative critical
reception. Im passioned arguments against this type o f poetics contend that by acting as shaman or as
interm ediary, a person or text constructs itself as the vessel o f truth or objective reality. Snyder, by
constructing his poetry in this shaman-song style, therefore seems to construct himself—behind the veil of the
text—as the source o f truth. Largely because o f this, Snyder has been attacked over the years by those o f the
“theories o f identity” camp, w h o have repeatedly asserted that his poetry misappropriates typically marginalized
voices (nature. N ative American, other indigenous peoples) for his ow n W esternized, Romanticized, or other
ideological purposes. A lthough the arguments for and against a poetics o f this sort are varied and com plex, a
basic defense o f Snyder claims that these charges reduce all w riting to an autobiographical function, and would
further assert that Snyder’s poetry isn’t interested in identity, that it isn’t even interested in selfhood at all. In a
statement touching upon this idea, Snyder, w hen directed to the lack of personal presence in his poetry by Julia
Martin in a 1990 interview , said, “I’m not interested in being a consistent poet speaking, speaking for m y ow n
sentim ents and sensibilities (166). A nd w hen further asked about what subject he thought was interesting to
talk about in his poetry, Snyder responded, “Talking about you r non-self! [laughs.]” (167). In this last
statement, w e can see that from a non-dualistic perspective, to speak about oneself is to speak about the world,
and to speak about anything in the w orld is to speak about ones self and non-self. For a more detailed defense
of Snyder’s shaman-song poetics, see T im D ean ’s essay, “The O ther’s Voice: Cultural Imperialism and Poetic
Im personality in Gary Snyder’s M ountains a n d R ivers W ithout End.”
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Although Snyder’s language, like Abrams’, constructs a surface dualism of “human”
and “non-human,” the distinction is made in order to transcend this dualism. Snyder
recognizes that the human/nature or culture/nature binary, which posits that certain human
attributes like the soul and language are distinct from and above the natural world,
constructs the natural world as other, and so he often substitute terms like “extra-human
realm” or “non-human realm” for “nature.” For the sake of public understanding, however,
Snyder typically uses the term “nature” to refer to the non-human realm which is thought to
be separate and outside the “self.” What we often think of as “nature” Snyder thinks of
within a Buddhist awareness of original nature, and his various expressions for this original
nature are “the nature of the nature of nature,” “the wild,” and “thusness.”
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IV.

A ZEN EFFACEM ENT O F T H E “SELF” / “N A TU R E” D IV ISIO N
O n ce y o u w ere apes, and even n ow , to o , man is m ore ape than
any ape.
N ietzsch e’s Zarathustra, Thus Spake Zarathustra

In the West, we are accustomed to defining both physical objects and ideas in terms
of binary oppositions. One such binary, which I have already mentioned, is the mind/body
opposition—a distinction that arose in connection with the earlier subject/object
dichotomy, and which has traditionally valorized the rational perceptions associated with the
mind over sensuous perceptions. Working against this Cartesian binary and the resulting
preference ascribed to the mind, Snyder, as a practicing Zen Buddhist, understands that the
body is to be trusted. In an video interview he gave in 1984, Snyder asserted the importance
of listening to one’s body as he recounted the real-life events that surround the poem “Piute
Creek,” from his book Riprap {Gary). As Snyder said in the interview, “Piute Creek” recalls
his experiences around a campfire with either a cougar or coyote close behind him in the
dark:
One granite ridge
A tree, would be enough
O r even a rock, a small creek,
A bark shred in a pool.
Hill beyond hill, folded and twisted
Tough trees crammed
In thin stone fractures
A huge moon on it all is too much.
The mind wanders. A million
Summers, night air still and the rocks
Warm. Sky over endless mountains.
All that junk that goes with being human
Drops away, hard rock wavers
Even the heavy present seems to fail
This bubble of a heart.
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Words and books
Like a small creek of a high ledge
Gone in the dry air.
A clear attentive mind
Has no meaning but that
W hich sees is truly seen.
N o one loves rock, yet we are here.
N ight chills. A flick
In the moonlight
Slips into Juniper shadow.
Back there unseen
Cold proud eyes
O f Cougar or Coyote
Watch me rise and go. {GSR 400)
At the beginning of this poem, a narrowed field of vision is pictured: “One granite ridge / A
tree, would be enough / O r even a rock, a small creek, / A bark shred in a pool” and then
the poem ’s frame of vision expands to depict a wider panorama: “Hill beyond hill” and “A
huge m oon.” The expansion of the speaker’s field of vision causes him to wander out of his
narrowed state of mind into a perception of the hills and mountains set within geologic
scales of time: “A million / Summers.” At this point in the poem, those things that make
the speaker distinctly human (“words and books”) drop away. The image of the hard rock
wavering breaks down the normal perception of rock as solid and stable and indicates that
the speaker is now seeing with an attentive mind of emptiness, since the seeing is free of
categories and conceptions about things: “All that junk that goes with being human” (GSR
400). The wavering of the rock also reveals the rock to be a fluid process, an activity that
underscores both geologic history and the Buddhist belief that every phenomenon (dharma)
is constantly changing in a reflection of what Buddhists describe as transience or
impermanence (Murphy 50).^^ At this meditative point in the poem, the speaker’s voice has
described how “All that junk that goes with being human / Drops away” before the

^ In this essay, as in m ost Buddhist literature, “transience” and “im perm anence” are synonym ous terms.
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detection of the animal’s presence, and “that / Which sees” has now become the big mind
or mind of emptiness, stripped of meanings constructed by the dualistic mind, which is ideaconstructing and filled with “Words and books” {GSR 400). It is only when those things we
think of as distinctly human are removed—“Words and books / Like a small creek off a
high ledge / Gone in the dry air”—that the narrator is able to see with a clear and attentive
mind. Such a translucent state of mind is known as wu-hsin, literally “no-mind,” by Zen
Buddhists. It is a state of absolute attentiveness, free of self-consciousness and fixed ideas,
wherein the mind functions freely and easily.R eferring to “Piute Creek” in an interview,
Snyder says that he was tipped off to the presence of a coyote or cougar by the hairs on the
back of his neck, which he says “are always correct” {Gary). Such an awareness is possible in
the poem because, “A clear attentive mind / Has no meaning but that / Which sees is truly
seen.” Because of this clear mind, operating without words that construct meanings, Snyder
is alerted to the presence of the animal; he is allowed to see in a way that would be
impossible had his mind been distracted and filled with words or books.

M ind, for the Zen Buddhist, cannot be regarded as an object o f thought or action, as if it were a thing to be
grasped and controlled. T o attempt to do so creates a dualism. M ind, accordingly, is inseparable from itself.
There is no separation from m ind in the true mind. A s Shunryu Suzuki says, “[I]n the sutra it says, ‘There are
n o eyes, n o ears, no nose, n o tongue, n o body or m in d ...” This ‘no-m ind’ is Zen mind, w hich includes
everything (115). T o illustrate this point, in a poem from “T he Heart Sutra,” clear dewdrops stand for an
em pty m ind that is free o f dualistic conceptions and ideas:
W h en just as they are.
W h ite dewdrops gather
O n scarlet m aple leaves.
Regard the scarlet beads! (Stryck 12)
T he dew drops o f this p oem allow the color o f the m aple leaves to shine through, just as one w ho sees w ith a
m ind o f em ptiness allow s sensuous experience to shine through as reality. W ithin this awareness, mind-isbody-is-emptied-awareness. There is no m ind other than experiencing-seeing-and-being-seen. According to
Zen, participation in this seeing-and-being-seen brings the M ind into awareness o f reality. Referring to this
Buddhist understanding o f mind, w hich is the entire field in w hich the m ind-body com plex participates, Snyder
says in Turtle Island, “N o w , w e are both in, and outside, the w orld at once. T he on ly place this can be is the
Mind. A h, w hat a poem . It is what is, com pletely, in the past, present, and future simultaneously, seeing being,
and being seen” (114).
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In the essay “Poetry, Com munity and Climax,” Snyder explicitly claims that
language, ego, and custom (synchronous with fixed ideas) act as barriers to this sort of
originary relationship with the natural world:
Human beings buffer themselves against seeing the natural world directly. Language,
custom, ego and personal advantage strategies all work against seeing. So the first
wholeness is wholeness with nature. (33)
Snyder feels that the desire to distinguish ourselves in any way from the natural world has
been most harmful. As he says:
People from the high civilizations in particular have elaborate notions of
separateness and difference and dozens of ways to declare themselves “out of
nature.” As a kind of game this might be harmless. [...] But at the very minimum
this call to a special destiny on the part of human beings can be seen as a case of
needlessly multiplying theories (Occam’s razor). And the results—in the human
treatment of the rest of nature—have been pernicious. {PW 107)
The most basic expression of this separateness is located in the words “self” and “nature,”
each term asserting an existence separate from the other. Such separateness is dismantled in
much of Snyder’s w ork by a Buddhist denial of this separateness.
In a brief poem, in which the subject matter appears to be similar to his experience
with either a cougar or coyote in “Piute Creek,” Snyder re-visions the “self”/ ”nature”
dualism as the speaker describes how his poetry is informed by a no-mind meeting of
himself with the natural world:

How Poetry Comes to Me
It comes blundering over the
Boulders at night, it stays
Frightened outside the
Range of my campfire
I go to meet it at the
Edge of the light. {GSR 557)
In this instance, poetry comes from the meeting of the animal world—as represented
through actions normally associated with cougars and coyotes—with the speaker at the edge
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of the light. Interestingly, it is the light from the fire that both draws the animal near and
keeps it at bay, and it is only at the edge of the light, at the liminal space where the human
and the animal blurs, that poetry “comes” to the speaker. The speaker’s poetry seems to
thus emerge out of a clearing of the divisions between himself and the natural world. That
the poem does not specifically name a creature implies that the creation of the speaker’s
poetry is not contingent upon the emergence of a specific or unique animal, but opens the
poem to include an expanding range of creatures. In the space where poetry comes to the
speaker, the human world, absolutely attuned to the natural world, is the natural world.
Highlighting the dissolution of this “self”/ ”nature” division, the final lines to Snyder’s poem
“Straight-Creek—Great Burn” emphasize again a congruity between the poetic process and
nature:
A whoosh of birds
swoops up and round
tilts back
almost always flying all apart
and yet hangs on!
together;
never a leader,
all of one swift
empty
dancing

mind.

They arc and loop & then
their flight is done,
they settle down,
end of poem. {NN 241)
The final line of this poem seems to call attention to the difference between the experience
and the poetic representation of that experience, yet another way to view this ending, as
Robert Kern has pointed out, is to view the experience—the flight and settling down of the
birds—as itself a poem (“Silence” 116). I would go further than Kern, however, and argue
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that because the speaker witnesses the flight of the birds as the poem he is also seeing with a
mind of emptiness and therefore perceives no true distinction between the phenomenal
events and the poetic representation of those events: they are one. The lines “all of one
swift / empty / dancing

mind” lack a clear antecedent and so draw the birds, as well as

the perceiving speaker, into this description of an emptied awareness. Although this
description may at first look like an anthropomorphism, Snyder, as we know, does not
envision a gap between the human and natural realms, so for him to describe these realms in
a Buddhist vocabulary is to assert the interpenetration and mutual dependency of the natural
and human realms. From a Buddhist perspective, the poem’s use of “mind” is also of
interest in that “mind”—what we tend to think of as a disembodied consciousness (“self”)—
is characterized by the adjectives “swift” and “dancing,” each of which normally functions to
describe physical objects. According to Snyder’s Buddhist sense of Mind, Mind is “seeing
being, and being seen” {TI114)—it is a totalizing sense of Being that subsumes the natural
and human realms into a totalizing sense of awareness. In the instance of this poem, as is
the case in so many of Snyder’s poems, the natural world is therefore describable in human
terms and vice versa; the two constructed realms cannot be separated or distinguished.
Referring to Dôgen Kigen’s Mountains and Waters Sutra in the essay contained within
The Practice o f the Wild called “Blue Mountains Constantly Walking,” Snyder uses the D'**century Zen master’s description of the way mountains, rivers and humans function to
demonstration the wholeness that wraps humans into the processes of nature. “His
mountains and streams,” Snyder says of Dôgen, “are the processes of the earth, all of
existence, process, essence, action, absence; they roll being and non-being together. They
are what we are, we are what they are” (103). Mind, according to Dôgen and other
Buddhists, is an extension of the natural world. It is not separate from the sensual world, as
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certain Western philosophical traditions have tried to assert. The human mind and body are
one; mind is body is nature. Humans are thus in no way outside of fellow animate or
inanimate beings. As one of the “Little Songs for Gaia” says in Snyder’s book No-Nature:
“As the crickets’ soft autumn hum / is to us, / so are we to the trees / as are they / to the
rocks and hills” (287).
According to Robert Kern, in “Blue Mountains Constantly Walking,” Snyder adopts
strategies—oddly enough for a writer who often seems hostile to poststructuralist theories
and their jargon—that are nothing if not deconstructive in their efforts to break down binary
oppositions between art and nature, culture and nature, and humans and nature
(“M ountains” 7).^^ As Snyder sees it, “Mountains and rivers” form a dyad that make
wholeness possible, and Dôgen Kigen’s notion of mountains and waters, in his “Mountains
and Waters Sutra,” Snyder explains,
[...] is a way to refer to the totality of the process of nature. As such it goes well
beyond dichotomies of purity and pollution, natural and artificial. The whole with its
rivers and valleys obviously includes farms, fields, villages, cities, and the (once
comparatively small) dusty world of human affairs. {PW 102)
From this perspective, humans cannot be thought of outside the realm of nature. In a
thoroughly de-centered manner, Snyder continues a page later:
For those who would see directly into essential nature, the idea of the sacred is a
delusion and an obstruction: it diverts us from seeing what is before our eyes: plain
thusness. Roots, stems, and branches are all equally scratchy. N o hierarchies, no
equality. N o occult and exoteric, no gifted kids and slow achievers [...] no natural or
artificial. {PW 103)
To emphasize the indivisibility of the human and natural realms, Snyder describes a group of
mountains as if they were human:

The reader should be aware that the play o f dijféranœ, w hich Derrida sees as deconstructing binaries such as
“culture” and “nature,” is quite different from the u nity o f opposites that results from a Buddhist
deconstruction o f the same binary.
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So the blue mountains walk to the kitchen and back to the shop, to the desk and to
the stove. We sit on a park bench and let the wind and rain drench us. The blue
mountains walk out to put another coin in the parking meter, and go on down to the
7-Eleven. The blue mountains march out to the sea, shoulder the sky for a while,
and slip into the water. (PW 103; italics added)
In this passage, Snyder swaps, and thereby melts together, the natural and the human. The
insertion of “We” into the passage pulls the reader into the actions. Because the subject of
the passage is the blue mountains, the use of “we” brings the reader (the human realm) into
relation with the mountains (nature). Also, the anthropomorphized actions of the blue
mountains attempt the same from the reverse angle; they show how the natural, geological
processes of the earth are not significantly different from those processes of everyday
ordinary life. The processes of daily human life are therefore no different than the processes
of mountains and rivers forming each other (PW 101). According to Dôgen, “If y ou doubt
mountains walking you do not know your own walking” (f^W 103). Humans and mountains
are part of this “thusness”—what Snyder thinks of as the essential nature of the universe,
which is in the continual process of impermanence, as represented in Dôgen's “Mountains
and Waters Sutra” by “the obvious fact of the water-cycle and the fact that mountains and
rivers indeed form each other” ( R W 101).
In “Endless Streams and Mountains,” the opening poem to Snyder’s epic long poem
Mountains and Rivers Without End, the process of mountains and rivers forming each other is
described as.
Step back and gaze again at the land:
it rises and subsides—
ravines and cliffs like waves of blowing leaves—
stamp the foot, walk with it, clap! Turn,
the creeks come in, ah!
strained through boulders,
mountains walking on water,
water ripples every hill. (8)
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N ature is constantly moving in the above stanzas; mountains are given shape by water
(“water ripples every hill”), while waters are “strained through boulders.” Snyder also
expresses this sentiment earlier in the same poem: “...The water holds up the mountains, /
The mountains go down in the water...’” (7). He later adds the final line to the poem:
“Streams and mountains never stay the same” (9). In another process-oriented poem in
Mountains and Rivers Without End, this impermanence is articulated as, “Rocks of water, /
Water out of rocks” (68), and in the poem “The Mountain Spirit,” also W iûim Mountains and
Rivers Without End, this same motif is repeated:
Peaks like Buddhas at the heights
send waters streaming down
to the deep center of the turning world.
And the M ountain Spirit always wandering
hillsides fade like walls of cloud
pebbles smoothed off sloshing in the sea (145)
If the phrase “mountains and rivers” is a way to refer to the totality of the processes of
nature, then that process is one of constant change: “nature” is impermanence itself.
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V.

“THE WILD”: SNYDER’S ECO-BUDDHIST STILL POINT
T o be truly free one m ust take on the basic conditions as they
are—painful, im perm anent, open, im perfect—and then be
grateful for im perm anence and the freedom it grants us. For in
a fixed universe there w ould be no freedom. W ith that freedom
w e im prove campsites, teach children, oust tyrants. The w orld is
nature, and in the long run inevitably w ild, because the wild, as
the process and essence o f nature, is also an ordering of
im perm anence.
Gary Snyder, The Practice o f the W ild

Although Snyder, as we have seen, makes no distinction between the human and
natural realms, he does distinguish between what is “wild” and what is “natural.” This
distinction is essential to a basic understanding of Snyder’s particular intellectual synthesis of
Buddhism with ecological biology and postmodernism. “Everything” Snyder says, “in the
universe is natural, otherwise it couldn’t exist, but that which has not been altered by human
intention or manipulation is what we call wild” {Gary)}^ What, then, does he mean by
“wild?”
For Snyder, “the wild” is closely related to the Chinese definition of “Dao”—the way
of nature—and things within the way are,
beyond categories, self-organizing, self-informing, playful, surprising, impermanent,
insubstantial, independent, complete, orderly, unmediated, freely manifesting, selfauthenticating, self-willed, complex, quite simple. {PW 10)

Snyder’s statement w ould, at first glance, appear to collapse under his ow n logic o f interrelatedness, since if
everything is interrelated then nothing is not human and no human is not natural. This statement also appears
to indicate that hum ans are som eh ow distinct from the natural w orld. H ow ever, this is exactly the sort of
thinking Snyder’s w ork attempts to dispel. A lthough Snyder does not clarify it in the video interview from
w hich this quote is taken, “human intention or manipulation” does not refer to all human thought and action.
“[H ]um an in tention or m anipulation” refers specifically to those thoughts and actions that are not filtered
through em ptiness awareness (remember that em ptiness awareness is free o f fixed ideas or intentions). As I
w ill soon sh ow , w hat Snyder defines as “the w ild ” w ill include the natural w orld as w ell as the human world of
experience and action filtered through em ptiness awareness and a collective sensuous unconscious.
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N ot surprisingly, the terms “beyond categories,” “unmediated,” “freely manifesting,”
“insubstantial,” “playful,” “surprising,” and “quite simple” are apt descriptions of emptiness
awareness. This list of descriptives, Snyder thinks, is also not far from the Buddhist term
Dharma, with Dharma’s original sense of “firming and forming” {pW 10). In the essay, “A
Place in Space,” Snyder continues to connect his definition of “the wild” to Buddhist
precepts. This time it is impermanence; “Wild” he says, “is a name for the way that
phenomena continually actualize themselves” {GSR 260). In this same essay, Snyder points
out that nature is an unknowably organized chaos and that this is its fundamental nature—
what he calls the “the nature of the nature of nature” in The Practice o f the Wild. “The wild” is
a process for Snyder; it is mountains and rivers without end; it is also humans as nature.
“The wild” is also a synonym for “thusness”—“thusness, is the nature of the nature
of nature. The wild in the wild” {PW 103)—and both words refer to an organized chaos,
firmed and formed by intrinsic organizing principles. Snyder’s correlation of “the wild” with
“thusness” is of particular interest since “thusness” is Snyder’s take on the Buddhist term
“suchness.” As it is generally understood by Buddhists, “suchness” denotes an experience
of the world filtered through emptiness awareness. That Snyder uses this Buddhist
description of a sensuously embodied awareness to add to his definition of nature as
“thusness” / “the wild” is characteristic, since he does not envision a true gap between the
“self” and “nature.” “The wild” and “thusness” are thus terms that simultaneously describe
the human and the natural.
Asserting this interpenetration of the human and the natural in “the wild,” the poem
“Ripples on the Surface” represents the human realm as “the house” and the natural realm
as “the wild”:
[...]—Nature not a book, but zperformance, a
high old culture
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Ever fresh events
scraped out, rubbed out, and used, used, again—
the braided channels of the rivers
hidden under fields of grass—
The vast wild
The house, alone.
The little house in the wild.
The wild in the house.
Both forgotten.
N o nature
Both together, one big empty house. {GSR 568)
The poem ’s conventional use of the term “the wild” as representative of “nature” is distinct
from Snyder’s use of the term “the wild,” since Snyder’s use of the “the wild” in The Practice
o f the Wild denotes a non-dualistic awareness of nature intermeshed with the “self,” while this
poem ’s use of “the wild” refers to what we tend to think of as the natural world. This
second half of the poem intermingles the human realm of “the home” with that other home,
“the wild.” “The wild” interpenetrates the home (“The wild in the house”) just as the house
interpenetrates “the wild” (“The little house in the wild”). The two are indistinguishable:
“one big empty house.” When this interpenetration happens, the split between the two is
forgotten (“Both forgotten”) in a clearing out of the division between the human and the
natural (“one big empty house”). The use of the term “empty” is here an overt reference to
an emptiness awareness, and the pure “thusness” of nature becomes our home, becomes us,
“one big em pty house” in which we dwell. In this movement, nature-is-our home-is-usperceiving-through-emptiness.
“The wild,” like emptiness, is to Snyder a non-concept in the sense that it denies any
fixed conception of nature-humans. As Snyder says of nature’s wildness in No Nature's
preface page:

33

w hatever it is, it will not fulfill our conceptions or expectations [...] There is no set
“nature” either as “the natural world” or “the nature of things.” The greatest respect
we can pay to nature is not to trap it, but to acknowledge that it eludes us and that
our own nature is also fluid, open, and conditional.
Hakuin Zenji puts it “self-nature that is no nature/ ...far beyond mere
doctrine.” An open space to move in, with the whole body, the whole mind. My
gesture has been with language.
When “the wild” is not trapped by human conception, when it is stripped of fixed ideas, it is
allowed to be fluid and open, to go beyond the category of “it.” Seeing with a mind of
emptiness allows nature to be seen thusly (“—Nature not a book, but ^performance, a / high
old culture”).
Snyder’s use of the Buddhist term “thusness” to refer to “the wild” is also of interest
in that it indicates that he imagines “the wild”—or “the nature of nature of nature” {PW
103), as Snyder also calls it—to be open. From a Buddhist standpoint, to define or conceive
of “the wild” as a finite system is to make the mistake of denying the ever-changing world of
phenomena, while from a postmodern perspective, which Snyder is quite aware of, to define
or conceive of it as a finite system is to assert a static reality or center.
As a term that knots the human and the natural realm together in an open
expression, “the wild” is like Derrida’s statement that “There is nothing outside of the text”
{Dissemination 158), because, for Derrida, nature has never been anything but writing, which
is the process of dijférance. As he says in Dissemination,
There have never been anything but supplements, substitutive significations which
could only come forth in a chain of differential references, the “real” supervening,
and being added only while taking on meaning from a trace and from an invocation
of the supplement, etc. And thus to infinity, for we have read, in the text, that the
absolute presence. Nature, that which words like “real m other” name, have always
already escaped, have never existed; that what opens meaning and language is writing
as the disappearance of natural presence. (158-59; emphasis added in original)
N ot even nature can be thought of as separate from textuality. Nature is here perceived as a
fluid and differential text, just like “the wild.” What this seems to “mean” (if I can even use
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that term when speaking about Derrida) is that, for Snyder, phenomenal nature functions
like language; as Barbara Johnson’s “Translator’s Introduction” says, in a comment on this
passage, “Nothing, indeed, can be said to be «ottext” (xiv). Nature is not literally language
for Snyder; rather, it is of a similar structure as language. It is like a text: a deferring web of
meaning.^^
As Snyder sees it, nature (read “the wild”) is also not a completely indeterminate
text, as he envisions nature to have a recognizable order and knowable surface structures. In
this manner, nature is both determinant and indeterminate. Snyder suggests that one of the
manifestations of this determinant indeterminacy appears in ecological biology. Subsuming
ecological biology into his non-dualistic awareness of nature, Snyder blends together “the
wild” with what the Spanish ecologist Ramon Margalef calls “climax systems.” “Climax
systems” are natural systems that have reached optimal levels of diversity or biological
complexity, wherein evolutionary and ecological stability is the rule {RW 115-116).^^
Although scientists have claimed to locate optimal levels of diversity or biological complexity
within an ecosystem (surface structures), they have so far been unable to identify the deep
structures responsible for this ordering.^* For Snyder, nature’s “climax systems” are
analogous to the mind when it is fed by its thought “detritus”:

^ Derrida has claim ed that m eanings are m ultiple, but not to the extent that they are indefinite or infinite.
A lthough w ords are always open to gaining future meaning, meaning is a function o f present context. Words
gain new m eaning by insertion into new contexts, yet our inability to predict these new contexts does not seem
to prevent us from having a reasonably secure grasp o f the finite range o f m eanings our words have in their
present contexts (Moran 472). Language’s inability to convey a traditional sense o f meaning, however, stems
from w ords’ irreducibility. Because each presence (“cat,” for instance) requires its absence (not-“cat”: “hat,” “bat,”
“m at,” etc.), each w ord has an irreducible double m eaning, and so m eaning, as framed w ithin a traditional
W estern m etaphysics that privileges presence, eludes us.
^ In a warning note, Margalef and various other scientists have suggested that the evolution o f species flows in
line w ith the tendency o f system s to reach clim ax.
^ There is still m uch debate am ong scientists as to w hether or not biological com plexity equals a healthy
ecosystem . Margalef and Snyder w ou ld ob viously claim that it is essential to a healthy ecosystem , but this
question is far from resolved. A lso, m y use o f the term “deep” indicates that w hen scientists or philosophers
search for underlying structures, th ey are participating in the search for larger blocks o f understanding or
unifying fields w ith in w hich to group their existing theories.
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I would then suggest: as climax forest is to biome, and fungus is to the recycling of
energy, so “enlightened mind” is to daily ego-mind [...] When we deepen and enrich
ourselves, looking within, under-standing ourselves, we come closer to being like a
climax system. Turning away from grazing on the “immediate biomass” of
perception, sensation, and thrill; and reviewing memory, internalized perception,
blocks of inner energies, dreams, the leaf fall of day to day consciousness, liberates
the energy of our own sense detritus. {RW 173-174)
In this interpenetrating passage, the “enlightened mind” is spoken of in terms of the Earth
floor, as a bubbling mass of self-organizing detritus that fuels the daily “ego-mind” in its
pursuits. Here again, nature is our nature; there is no separation between natural and human
realms. “O ur bodies are wild,” Snyder says:
The world is our consciousness, and it surrounds us. There are more things in the
mind, in the imagination than “you” can keep track of—thoughts, memories, images,
angers, delights, rise unbidden. The depths of the mind, the unconscious, are our
inner wilderness areas. {pW 16)
In a quasi-Jungian manner, our minds are part of “the wild” {PW 16). And because our
conscious minds operate on top of the matrix of “the wild,” language, Snyder thinks, is
fundamentally connected to the unconscious layers of interaction with the sensuous world.
Ironically, however, it is through our traditionally anthropocentric perceptions of
language, that Snyder feels we have abstracted ourselves from our inter-connection with the
sensuous world. We have diverged from what is “the wild,” that non-dualistic and self
organizing Dharma Snyder sees as the rule of the universe {PW 103). About the true nature
of language, he writes:
Like the imagination and the body, language rises unbidden. It is of a complexity
that eludes our rational intellectual capabilities. All attempts at scientific description
of natural languages have fallen short of completeness, as the descriptive linguists
readily confess. {PW 16)
Language, like the natural systems from which it springs, is in fact wild—it cannot be tamed
or defined. “I think language is, to a great extent, biological,” Snyder says, freely admitting
that “language takes an enormous amount of cultural shaping,” while also maintaining that

36

“the structures of it have the quality of a wild system,” which are “self-managing, self
organizing, and self-propagating” {GSR 329). This inability to accurately describe natural
language is as it should be for Snyder. There is no way to understand “the vast word-hoards
in the depths of the wild unconscious” {PW 16) that come from someplace else and that he
thinks, in a rather lyrical moment, may be “the way clouds divide and mingle” or “the way
the many flowerlets of a composite blossom divide and re-divide” {PW 17). As a result of
this logic, humans can neither claim to understand the origins of language, nor can they
claim that natural languages are the result of an organized thought construction, for to do so
would be species-egoism:
It would be a mistake to think that human beings got “smarter” at some point and
invented first language and then society. Language and culture emerge from our
biological-social natural existence, animals that we were/are. Language is a mindbody system that coevolved with our needs and nerves. {PW 16)
According to Snyder, language is part of the animal and sensuous world: “Language is
learned in the house and in the fields, not at school” {PW 16). It is born first out of direct
sensuous experiences with the world.
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VI.

W ILD LANGUAGE
H ave m ountains, and waves, and skies, no significance but what
w e consciously give them , w hen w e em ploy them as emblems of
our thoughts? T he w orld is em blem atic. Parts o f speech are
m etaphors because the w h ole o f nature is a m etaphor o f the
hum an m ind.
Ralph W aldo Em erson, N ature

[Zazen] taught m e som ething about the nature of thought and it
led m e to the conclusion—in spite o f som e linguists and literary
theorists o f the French ilk—that language is n ot where w e start
thinking. W e think before language, and thought images com e
in to language at a certain point. W e have fundamental thought
processes that are prelinguistic. Some o f m y poetry reaches back
to that.
Gary Snyder, Paris R eview Interview 1992

In this century we have come to largely believe—thanks to Saussure, Heidegger,
Lacan, and other theorists—that language largely constructs the self, and post-structuralist
theories following Derrida’s lead have often emphasized the self-reflexive nature of language
in order to deconstruct traditional Western binaries and the oppressive power structures they
maintain. Derrida et al. would maintain that language is constantly fluid, and that every sign
always involves every other sign, whereby meaning is always deferred. For the ecocritic and
ecopoet—and Snyder can be considered both—the problem with the dominant post
structuralist position is the assertion that all experience is mediated by language or differance.
Ecopoetry, Leonard Scigaj claims, argues the reverse of these post-structuralist positions;
language, he claims, is mediated by experience (29).^ According to Scigaj, language is an
instrument the ecopoet continually refurbishes to articulate his or her originary experiences

^ W hen Snyder’s linguist friend asks him in The Practice o f the Wild, “Is there any experience whatsoever that is
n ot m ediated b y language?” Snyder responds b y banging his beer m ug sharply on the table, thereby startling
half a d ozen people at the bar (71).
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in nature (29). In Snyder’s case, we might slightly alter Scigaj’s claim to state that language is
an instrument that the poet continually refurbishes to articulate his or her sensuous
experiences in the world. O r, to put it another way, the ecopoet relates a sensuous
experience through language, and thereby constructs texts that influence current and future
historical, social, and ideological contexts, particularly as they affect our interactions with the
environment. For the ecopoet, originary experiences with the sensuous world become the
center of meaning that informs language.^® Yet, as we know, language is filled with
ambiguities and hierarchies. Many postmodernist critics—especially those of the Marxist
A lthough Derrida and other postmodernists de-center the Western metaphysics o{presence and absence, they
end up constructing the play o f language as a center o f Being (albeit a fluid center, but nonetheless a center) by
em phasizing its prim ary role in the construction o f the “self.” In opposition to this view , Snyder, other
ecopoets, and eco-philosophers have argued that languages evolve from a sensuous interaction w ith “nature”;
contra Derrida, Snyder and others argue that it is not dijférance but rather humans-experiencing-nature that stand
behind the text. (For a recent articulation o f this thought see the third and fourth chapters o f David Abram’s
book. The Spell o f the Sensuous, o f w hich Snyder, incidentally, gave a glowing review.) Although such an effort to
re-center Being around experiences w ith nature w ould seem anti-postm odern and anti-Derridean in the
apparent attem pt to construct a static and present source o f Being, Snyder’s Buddhist-influenced definition of
nature as “the w ild ” (an open and fluid field) de-centers nature as a static source o f Being. Snyder’s effort to
re-center Being, however, around sensuous experiences w ith nature mediated by emptiness awareness, what he
calls “u nconditioned m ind-in-the-m om ent[s]” (P1F70), and around those languages that evolve out o f these
experiences, seems to construct these specific non-verbal, meditative experiences as a rtd d îm eà presence. Those
sensuous experiences that lack this m editative clarity, as w ell as the languages that evolve out o f such fallen
states, w ou ld then seem to construct an absence. In this w ay, Snyder’s w ork appears very m uch opposed to
D errida’s rejection o f the W estern m etaphysics o f Being zs presence. A s Barbara Johnson’s “Translator’s
Introduction” to D errida’s D issem ination says o f this reclam atory desire for presence,
[...] This project o f reappropriation is inherently self-subverting because its very starting point is not
presence itself but the desire for presence, that is, the lack o f presence. It is not possible to desire that
w ith w hich on e coincides. The starting p oint is thus not z p o in t but a difference, {xi)
T o expand u pon this statem ent Johnson quotes from Dissemination-.
W ith ou t the possib ility o f difference, the desire o f presence as such w ould not find its breathingspace. That means b y the same token that this desire carries in itself the destiny o f non-satisfaction.
Differance produces w hat it forbids, m aking possible the very thing that makes it impossible, (p. 143)
Both o f these quotes assert that each presence requires absence io r its being, and this logic w ould seem to suggest
that Snyder’s centering “u nconditioned m ind-in-the-m om ent[s]” w ith nature as a presence represents the
construction o f a hierarchical duahsm that privileges the presence o f these specific experiences over their absence.
In an egalitarian manner, however, Snyder describes these “unconditioned mind-in-the-moment[s]” with nature
as universal hum an experiences that happen on both a conscious and unconscious level; whether w e like it or
not, each o f us, as participants in “the w ild ,” continually adds to w ild language structures and w ild textuality.
Language poets, for instance, do not w ork in a sensuous vacuum; rather, th ey w ork out of a tradition of
languages form ed from “unconditioned m ind-in-the-m oment[s],” and no matter h o w disconnected language
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and post-colonial vein—have shown us that the world affects texts in ways that construct
these hierarchies/' The charge, then, against which ecopoetry must defend itself is that the
ecopoet is a constructor of ideologies centered around an individual’s experience of the
sensuous world. H ow does the ecopoet or Snyder deny that he or she is simply constructing
new and possibly oppressive ideologies based on their interactions with the sensuous world?
The answer to this question, for many ecopoets and thinkers, and particularly for Snyder, lies
in the way language is understood.
In Snyder’s view, the origin of all natural languages lies in a tribal culture’s desire to
connect its inner world of hopes and fears with the outer physical world {PCC 33), and the
poet’s job, according to Snyder, is to articulate this blending of the natural with culture
through the imaginative process (RW70). The poet, in a rather Romantic sense, is to be
considered the central mythmaker of his or her society;
[...] poetry is intimately linked to any culture’s fundamental worldview, body of lore,
which is its m yth base, its symbol base, and the source of much of its values—that
myth-lore foundation that underlies any society. {RW70)
The poet’s job becomes much like the traditional shaman’s position as intermediary between
the human and the more-than-human other, and for Snyder, this more-than-human other is
nature:
[T]he poet is a voice for the non-human, for the natural world, actually a vehicle for
another voice, to send it into the human world, saying there is a larger sphere out
there; that the humans are indeed children of, sons and daughters of, and eternally in
relationship with the earth. (PCC 33)
In another shamanistic moment, Snyder states that poets are.

poets are from the natural w orld, their w o rk reflects a certain w ild collective unconscious o f sensuous
experiences w ith the natural w orld.
3* O ne half o f m y argument is similar to Edward Said’s argument in The World, the Text, and the Critic that all art
is discourse-specific (i.e., that it cannot escape its historical, social, and ideological context). H ow ever, m y
association w ith Said’s assertion does not at all d eny the reverse—that art can and does influence historical,
social, and ideological contexts: a view succinctly expressed b y H enry James’ claim that “It is art that makes
life.”
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by virtue of the nature of their sensibilities, tuned into other voices than sinlply the
social or human voice. So they are like an early warning system that hears the trees
and the air and the clouds and the watersheds beginning to groan and complain. {R W
71)
For Snyder, the poet’s songs are like linguistic indicator species that reflect a culture’s
relationship with its sensuous environment.^^
Yet these myths, which take the form of ritual and song in primitive cultures and
which are presently understood to form ideologies, are ultimately of the same substance as
language. And language, Snyder thinks, is a structure whose ultimate nature is wild, beyond
human control:
The poor literati, I was thinking. Have philosophers and writers and such always
been ineffectual bystanders while the energetic power-players of church, state, and
market run the show? In the shorter time scale, this is true. Measured in centuries
and millennia, it can be seen that philosophy is always entwined with myth as both
explicator and critic and that the fundamental myth to which a people subscribe
moves at glacial speed but is almost implacable. Deep myths change on something
like the order of linguistic drift: the social forces of any given time can attempt to
manipulate and shape language usages for a while, as the French Academy does for
French, trying to stave off English loanwords. Eventually languages return to their
own inexplicable directions. (PW 61)
In this im portant passage, Snyder recognizes that deep myths, constructed by and
intertwined with languages, which are ultimately born out of the relation between humans
and their sensuous experience, are not easily changed by the short-term manipulation of
language. As Snyder says.
Some historians would say that “thinkers” are behind the ideas and mythologies that
people live by. I think that also goes back to maize, reindeer, squash, sweet potatoes,
and rice. (P W 61)
Behind this assertion is the implicit understanding that both myths and language are keys to
the construction of the individual and his or her culture. In Snyder’s view, to comprehend

A ccording to Snyder, the m yth base o f a culture “is m ost co m m on ly expressed and transmitted in the
culture b y p oem s, w h ich is to say by songs” {RW 7Ü ). “M uch o f the w orld ’s lore,” Snyder says, “has been
transm itted, in on e form or another, via poetic form s, measured language or sung language” {R W 7 0 ).
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the anthropology of languages is to see that all natural languages emerge from a culture in
direct connection with a natural world that is beyond categorization or explanation:
“[e]ventually languages return to their own inexplicable directions” (P1F61).
In a statement that deals with the individual’s approach to his or her self, but,
because of Snyder’s Buddhist framework, necessarily includes the larger contexts of language
and nature, Snyder argues that knowing a physical place helps one to know oneself as an
interdependent whole:
H ow does knowledge of place help us know the self? The answer, simply put, is that
we are all composite beings, not only physically but intellectually, whose sole
identifying feature is a particular form or structure changing constantly in time.
There is no “self” to be found in that, and yet oddly enough there is. Part of you is
out there waiting to come into you, and another part of you is behind you, and the
“just this” of the ever present moment holds all the transitory little selves in its
mirror. The Avatamsaka (“Flower Wreath”) jeweled-net-interpenetration-ecologicalsystems-emptiness-consciousness tells us, no self-realization without the Whole Self,
and the whole self is the whole thing. {OW 63-64)
In this last word grouping, the Jewel N et of Indra, ecological systems, and emptiness
awareness are all interrelated: each cannot exist without the other; they are interpenetrating.
Language, as a fundamental human function, is implicitly included in this interpenetrating
perspective, as it is intertwined with humans who are nature. As Snyder sees it, because
nature is us, and both are “the wild,” language is also a part of “the wild.” It is a
consequence of the indivisibility of the human and the natural realms.
Snyder thinks that language systems evolve out of experiences he calls
“unconditioned mind-in-the-moment[s],” which are those sensuous experiences with nature
structured by the emptied awareness of “suchness”:
I’d say it was the unconditioned mind-in-the-moment that eats, transforms, goes
beyond, language. Art, or creative play, sometimes does this by going directly to the
freshness and uniqueness of the moment, and to direct and unmediated experience.
{PW70)
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Much of Snyder’s poetry is an attempt to communicate these “unconditioned mind-in-themoments,” these non-linguistic, wild experiences from which language originally evolved:
the “crystal clouds of utterly incommunicable nonverbal states” that Snyder previously
referred to in “Poetry and the Primitive” {GSR 53).
A passage from Snyder’s poem “We Wash O ur Bowls in This Water” captures just
such an attempt:
Su Tung-p’o sat out one whole night by a creek on the slopes of Mt. Lu.
Next morning he showed this poem to his teacher.
The stream with its sounds is a long broad tongue
The looming mountain is a wide-awake body
Throughout the night song after song
H ow can I speak at dawn. (138)
Here again, this borrowed poem juxtaposes the natural world and the human world.^^ The
mountains surrounding the stream become “a wide-awake body,” while the stream becomes
“a long broad tongue” making sounds, which are the songs sung “throughout the night,” In
this instance, the natural world and the human world are inextricable. For Su Tung-p’o, to
speak is to feebly try and represent what he cannot—the Earth-body-mind connection is
spoken so well by the “suchness” of things that there is no need for his abstracted human
language. Through written language, the only way that Su Tung-p’o can accurately represent
his experience of being-the-world is to admit that he cannot accurately re-present this
experience. Buson, the 18'*’ century Japanese poet, articulates this same paradox in one of
his haikus: “Sweet springtime showers / And no words can express / How sad it all is.”
Silence, however, is not the only response to this “suchness.” For Snyder and Buson, the
language of poetry points to an unutterable sentiment, yet this pointing is always secondary
to the experience itself.
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According to Snyder, language, in the form of the written text, derives from
sensuous interactions with the world that are then related orally:
it is quite clear that the primary existence of language (“tongue”) is in the event, the
utterance. Language is not a carving, it is a curl of breath, a breeze in the pines. {PW
69)

In opposition to Derrida’s disapproval of the primacy Western culture has assigned to the
presence of oral transmissions over the absence of the written text, Snyder feels that “sound is
essentially your path in [to an unconditioned mind-in-the-moment]” and that “literature and
poetry are fundamentally oral, because language is oral, and writing is secondary” (Cantor
165).^'^ Hum an orality originally arose from sensuous experiences with the world: the “curl
of breath” arising from “a breeze in the pines.” Ultimately, Snyder thinks, all systems of
language derive from these “unconditioned mind-in-the-moments.” It is the blend of these
“unconditioned mind-in-the-moments” with culture that makes language. Although
languages are largely shaped by culture, cultures are largely shaped by “the wild”; “Wild
nature,” Snyder says, “is inextricably in the weave of self and culture” {PW 68).
In his essay “A Place in Space” Snyder rhetorically wonders about language’s role in
this weave, and in doing so he puts forth an aesthetics of language arts:
Is art an imposition of order on chaotic nature, or is art (also read “language”) a
m atter of discovering the grain of things, of uncovering the measured chaos that
structures the natural world? Observation, reflection, and practice show artistic
process to be the latter. {GSR 260)
Here again, “the wild” (“the measured chaos that structures the natural world”) is
interwoven with the artistic process. In this same essay, Snyder argues that consciousness,
mind, imagination, and language are all fundamentally wild {GSR 260).

A lthough Snyder’s use o f juxtaposition as a poetic device varies in effect, the frequent juxtaposition o f the
“hum an” w ith the “natural” is typically done in a w a y that negates any difference between the tw o.
In contradiction to the non-dualistic character o f his project, Snyder appears to construct a hierarchical
dualism by privileging the speech act over the w ritten text.
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In the hands of a culture disconnected from this fundamental reality, language begins
to remove us from an originary relationship with being-the-world. Snyder feels that the
majority of “humanists” (those rationalists descending from the Greek thinkers who largely
shaped cultural opinions) have spent a vast amount of time fiddling with language, focusing
on the way it works, while never essentially understanding its contents {PW7€). He thinks
that “when occidental logos-oriented philosophers uncritically advance language as a unique
human gift which serves as the organizer of the chaotic universe” it is a delusion, considering
the way wild layers of nature have “found their own way into symbolic structure and have
given us thousands of tawny human-language grammars” (PU^76-77). Essentially, the ageold obsession with the way language works and contemporary beliefs as to its hermetic
nature have abstracted us away from its original purpose as a tool used to harmonize a
society with itself, other societies, and—most importantly—with the natural world that
surrounds the society. Fittingly, Snyder’s poetry endeavors to re-align his readers with their
original nature, which is “the wild,” through language which points to a non-dualistic
experience of “the wild”: an emptiness awareness of an existence beyond categories, without
stability or permanence.
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VIL
T H E STRUCTURAL T E C H N IQ U E S O F SNYDER’S ECO-BUDDHIST
POETICS

D elight is the innocent joy arising
w ith the perception and realization o f
the w onderful, em pty, intricate,
inter-penetrating,
m utually-em bracing, shining
single w orld b eyond all discrim ination
or opposites.
Gary Snyder, Turtle Island

In many of his poems, Snyder attempts to bring his reader into a relationship with
what the text refers to “in itself” through the absence of any explicit references to the
speaker. O n a structural level, the elision of the speaker allows him to take the focus away
from “I” and place it on those objects which largely comprise the poem—a move that tacitly
asserts Snyder’s Buddhist belief in the illusory nature of the “self” as autonomous entity and
which also draws the reader’s attention away from inner depths towards outer “suchness.”
A classic example of this lies in the first stanza of the poem “Mid-August at Sourdough
M ountain Lookout”:
Down valley a smoke haze
Three days heat, after five days rain
Pitch glows on the fir-cones
Across rocks and meadows
Swarms of new flies. {GSR 399)
In this part of the poem we are given concrete images and observations, and the poem all
but lacks the presence of a subject.^^ The subject here is the perceiving self, acting much like

A lthou gh the very act o f seeing im plies a seer, the intrusive presence o f the seer in the poem is removed as
far as is possible. W hat sees in this poem , instead o f an objective narrator w h o is to be thought of as outside or
separate from the w orld it sees, is a reflected representation o f the suchness o f things, which, as you may recall,
denotes an experience o f the w orld filtered through em ptiness awareness.
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Emerson’s transparent eye-ball. This technique emphasizes a world of attention beyond the
self and exemplifies what Robert Kern sees as the literal or metonymic character of much of
Snyder’s poetry (“Clearing” 162).
A poem like “Six-Month Song in the Foothills” also stresses the primary nature of
objects as opposed to the subjective interpretation of these objects:
In the cold shed sharpening saws.
a swallow’s nest hangs by the door
setting rakers in sunlight
falling from meadow through doorframe
swallows flit under eaves.
Grinding the falling axe
sharp for the summer
a swallow shooting out over,
over the river, snow on low hills
sharpening wedges for splitting.
Beyond the low hills, white mountains
and now snow is melting, sharpening tools;
pack horses grazing new grass
bright axes—and swallows
fly in to my shed. {NN 90)
Charles Altieri claims that the syntax of this poem ’s last stanza creates complex spatial
relationships where, grammatically, each of the last three nouns might fly into the shed—a
flooding effect that is aided by the lack of punctuation near the end (61). Echoing
W hitman’s quasi-Buddhist vision “I am vast...I contain multitudes,” the shed, Altieri asserts,
becomes a metaphor for the newly-awakened mind which is receptive to and contains the
world of perception (60). Snyder’s extensive use of participles also creates unusual
relationships between the natural world and the speaking subject. That the poet does not
supply explicit referents to the participles has two effects: the elision of antecedents to the
participles first draws attention to the lack of a subject, and then deliberately frees the
objects from the limits of the speaker’s subjectivity (Altieri 61). Only in the last line of the
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poem does the subject appear, and there it serves primarily to stress the convergence of
subject and object in the clear-perceiving space of the mind’s shed (Altieri 61). Snyder’s use
of participles in the poem also suggests impermanence by highlighting nature as an active
process.
The critic Jody N orton has said of this poem that the absence of logical and
syntactical connectives between lines results in an open series of juxtaposed images/actions
that tend to function freely with both those images/actions preceding and those following—
a technique that interconnects the images/actions so that their meaning is dependent upon
relation (57). Many critics have noted that this juxtaposed and elliptical style of poetry,
which has its roots in Eastern poetic forms such as the haiku and in Western modernist
poetic traditions of the Imagistic ilk, has typically been used in the 20* century to represent
the highly fragmented quality of modern life. As a structural mechanism, Norton claims,
“Juxtaposition creates a de facto connection between two elements of a poem: at the least,
they are related through contiguity” (51). Yet, in the 20* century, this contiguity has often
been employed to express a loss of unified meaning, which has arisen as a result of the sheer
diversity of perspectives as to “tru th ” and “reality.” In opposition to the convention of
placing unrelated elements next to each other in an expression of this diversity and loss of
unified meaning, Snyder typically employs juxtaposition to both reveal relation between
contiguous elements and also to convey a unified field of meaning.
This relation through contiguity, however, operates less on a this-is-like-that
metaphoric level than at a this-is-that equivalency in Snyder’s poetry, throughout Mountains
and Rivers Without End, for instance, when the human realm is juxtaposed with the “natural”
realm, it is done in an effort to stress the equivalency of the two worlds. Metaphor, which
operates on a this-is-like-that level, is typically characterizes a departure from the element
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described, and so the use of metaphor can be seen to highlight the subjective experience of
that element. As an example, when the speaker of Wallace Stevens’ poem “N ot Ideas about
the Thing but the Thing Itself” ends with the line “It was like / A new knowledge of reality”
(Stevens 388), the speaker’s use of “like” to compare the element to “a new knowledge of
reality” indicates a certain falling away or dislocation from the element itself. The verb “to
be”—“It was a new knowledge of reality”—would express an equivalency between the
element described and the poetic representation of the element, but the use of “like” inserts
the speaker’s subjective presence into the picture in an intrusion that draws the focus away
from the element itself.
Although Altieri has claimed to see the use of metaphor in “Six-Month Song in the
Foothills” and other poems by Snyder, much of his poetry does attempt to free itself from
the use of metaphor. Instead, as Kern has pointed out, Snyder’s poems typically work on a
literal or metonymic level. This style has the effect of emphasizing the referent, which
allows the objects/images to speak for themselves through an emptiness awareness. For
Snyder, it is only when objects/images speak for themselves that humans can be brought
into an originary relationship with their environment.
In the poem, “Thin Ice,” from Riprap, Snyder tries to show this relationship between
experience and language as he recounts falling through a sheet of ice:
[...]It creaked
The white air under
Sprang away, long cracks
Shot out in black,
M y cleated mountain boots
Slipped on the hard slick
—like thin ice—the sudden
Feel of an old phrase made r e a linstant of frozen leaf,
Icewater, and staff in hand.
“Like walking on thin ice—”
I yelled back to a friend,
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It broke and I dropped
Eight inches in. {NN 12)
The passage, “the sudden / Feel of an old phrase made real,” stresses Snyder’s belief that
language is brought to life when linked directly to sensuous world it attempts to represent.
The hum or of the poem—Snyder yelling the “old phrase” to his friend and then promptly
falling through the ice—takes on a seriousness when we see that the language does in fact
correlate to a referential reality. Snyder’s multiple use of “like” serves to mock the speaker
who describes what is actually happening in terms of an abstracted metaphor; It was not
“like thin ice” of “Like walking on thin ice,” it literally was walking on thin ice. Snyder’s dip
into the icy water acts as a reminder of language’s originally referential nature, given life
through the vocalization of the referent.
“Migration of Birds,” also from Riprap, reinforces this stress upon the real—what
Kern sees as “the reversal of the usual civilized process by which the world is transformed
into symbols so that it can be dealt with and manipulated conceptually” (“Clearing” 173):
It started just now with a hummingbird
Hovering over the porch two yards away
Then gone.
It stopped me studying [...]
Yesterday I rtzà Migration o f Birds-,
The Golden Plover and the Arctic Tern.
Today that big abstraction’s at our door
For juncoes and the robins all have left.
Broody scrabblers pick up bits of string
And in this hazy day
O f April summer heat
Across the hill the seabirds
Chase Spring north along the coast;
Nesting in Alaska
In six weeks. {NN 15)
The presence of the real birds in this poem has “stopped” Snyder’s study of them through
the abstraction of language, because “Today that big abstraction’s at our door.” This
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process of stripping away the abstractions of words from nature allows Snyder a nonlinguistic awareness.
Snyder’s poetry, however, does not call for the wholesale rejection of language, but
merely asks the reader to recognize that language is the direct extension of experiences with
one’s wild environment. In the poem, “Three Deer One Coyote Running in the Snow,” he
observes how animals write to one another by studying their tracks:
[...JLater:
I walk through where they ran
to study how that news all got put down. {NN 293)
The end of this poem indicates that in order to study animals’ communications one must
walk in their tracks, just as humans must study anthropology to understand their own
communications: “Language belongs to our biological nature,” Snyder says, “and writing is
just moose-tracks in the snow” {PW69). Here again, language, “nature,” and the “self” are
all interconnected in a net of existence.
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vin.
TH E EC O -BU D D H IST PRO JECT O F
M O U N T A IN S A N D R IV E R S W IT H O U T END
E arth V erse
W ide enough to keep yo u look in g
O pen enough to keep y o u m oving
D ry enough to keep y o u honest
P rickly enough to m ake y o u tough
Green enough to go on living
O ld enough to give y o u dreams
From M ountains an d R ivers W ithout E nd

W hen H uang-bo bid goodbye to N an-ch’iian, w h o saw him off
at the door, N an-ch’iian held out H uang-bo’s straw hat and said:
“Y our b od y is unusually big. Isn’t you r straw hat to o small?”
Huang-bo said “A lth ou gh m y hat is small the entire universe is
in it.”
F rom N o te s on “T he M ountain Spirit,” Mountains a n d R ivers
W ithout E n d

Mountains and Rivers Without Endisz'wor^s.ûistxvïesto swallowthe world by variously
trying to fit the world into raindrops, a hat, a painting of a rice cake, and other elements we
tend to think of as distinct from ourselves. In “The Hump-backed Flute Player,” for
instance, the anonymous speaker in the poem sees buddhas in the elements of nature:
And falling shining rain
Each drop—
Tiny people gliding slanting down:
A little buddha seated in each pearl—
And join the million waving grass-seed-buddhas
O n the ground. {MRWE 81)
The image of the multiple buddhas here represents the viewer’s enlightenment-realization
{satori) that the raindrops and the blades of grass have the same buddha-nature as the viewer
does; there is no distinction between the viewer and the viewed, since those who participate
in their buddha-nature participate in original nature. The anonymous speaker in this poem
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understands that he is the raindrops and the leaves of grass, and, likewise, the blades of grass
and the raindrops are him. In the opening of this poem the reader is told that the Buddhist
scholar-pilgrim Hsuan Tsang is carrying “emptiness” and “mind only”—a description that
correlates Hsuan Tsang not only with Kokop’ele, the mythical Hump-backed Flute Player of
H opi legend, but also with the anonymous speaker of the poem and the prophet Wovoka,
since each carries emptiness in either a pack, a hump, a hat, or his mind. Kokop’ele is
specifically said to be carrying a pack [“his hump is a pack” (79)], just as is the speaker in the
earlier poem “Night Highway 99” [“well man I just don’t feel right / without something on
my back” (14)] and the anonymous speaker of the “The Hump-backed Flute Player” [“Ah,
what am I carrying? What is this load?” (81)]. Because the prophet Wovoka’s hat is
described as “em pty,” Black Coyote is able to see “the whole world / in Wovoka’s empty
hat” (81). This image of emptiness-reveals-the-whole repeats itself in the poem “The
M ountain Spirit” when W ovoka’s prophetic vision of the pre-white-man world is melted
into the baby Krishna’s mouth (146): a cavity which, according to Snyder’s note on the
poem, contains the whole universe (163). Each of the characters in “The Hump-backed
Flute Player” is thus associated with one another through some form of hump, which is an
expression of “emptiness” or “mind only.” Furthermore, it is only after the anonymous
speaker becomes aware that the entire universe is in fact contained in rain drops and blades
of grass that he finds himself carrying the non-load of emptiness: “Ah, what am I carrying?
What is this load?” (81).
This use of seemingly isolated images to represent the whole of things is a poetic and
prose technique that Snyder has employed on many occasions. In “The Hump-backed Flute
Player,” for instance, the main speaking voice ends the section that describes what the
travelers carry by expanding an isolated sound image into the larger visual image of a cricket
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in space; “The ringing in your ears / is the cricket in the stars” {MRWE 82). More than
likely, this technique comes from a Buddhist tradition of inverting one’s preconceived
notions or ideas in the effort to bring about an awareness of the Dharma-.
The Buddha once said, Bhikshus (monks), if you can understand this blade of rice,
you can understand the laws of interdependence and origination. If you can
understand the laws of interdependence and origination, you can understand the
Dharma. If you understand the Dharma, you know the Buddha. {R W 35)
To understand the Buddha is to have knowledge of the Dharma; it is to see that “the wild” or
the plain “suchness” of a blade of rice is to see “the wild” or the plain “suchness” of one’s
own nature, which is all of nature. A mind of emptiness does not contain a conception of
nature because everything is part of this wholeness. As Snyder claims in The Practice o f the
Wild, those who would see directly into essential nature understand that there is no true
delineation between “natural” and “artificial” (103). This holistic vision is underscored in
“The Hump-backed Flute Player” by the anonymous speaker’s perception of the blades of
grass, an image which overtly refers to W hitman’s Leaves of Grass, and which also associates
the speaker’s emptiness awareness with Whitman’s vision of interdependence and Oneness.
It is also notable that Kokop’ele, the mythical Hump-backed Flute Player of the
Hopi people, is associated with emptiness in this poem, since he is a healing figure who
guided the ancient H opi people in their effort to find the center of their physical and
spiritual universe. According to Leslie Marmon Silko’s essay, “Landscape, History, and
Pueblo Imagination,” there is no distinction between the exterior (physical) and interior
(spiritual) landscapes made by the Pueblo elders’ view of their world, which she claims is
very similar to the Hopi elder’s view (275): “Viewers,” Silko says, “are as much a part of the
landscape as the boulders they stand on [...] The land, the sky, and all that is within them—
the landscape—includes human beings” (266-67). Silko also suggests that both Hopi and
Pueblo worldviews are based in a tradition of stories that reflect a viable relationship to their
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terrain, wherein the peoples are different from nature’s other creatures but spring from the
same sources—an awareness that, she says, “never deteriorated into Cartesian duality,
cutting off the human from the natural world” (273). Silko also claims that in these stories
only when the requisite balance was struck between “human and other^ (i.e. “nature”) could
the Pueblo people become a culture (273). Accordingly, culture seems to emerge, for the
H opi and Pueblo peoples, from a correspondence between the interior and exterior
landscapes. “[T]he Hopi elders,” Silko says, are thus “grateful to the landscape for aiding
them in their quest as spiritual people” (275). Because the figure of Kokop’ele is credited
with helping the Hopi people find the center of their physical universe, which Silko asserts is
equivalent to finding the center of their spirituality, Snyder may also associated him with an
emptiness awareness, since such an awareness denies the division between the interior
(“self”: the human) and the exterior (“nature”: the other).^^
"^hxou.^o\il Mountains and Rivers Without End, âprojeci that had been in the works
for forty years, Snyder continues to express this wholeness through the dismantling of the
division between the human and natural realms. In these interlinked long poems, the human
and the natural realms continually melt into one another. In “Covers the Ground,” trucks
on the freeways of California’s Central Valley are described as boulders interacting with a
glacial river:
trucks on the freeways,
Kenworth, Peterbilt, Mack,
rumble diesel depths,
like boulders bumping in an outwash glacial river {MR WE 66)

A lthough the epistem ologies o f various N ative American senses o f the u nity o f the subject and object seem
distinct from the epistem ologies o f Buddhist awarenesses o f this unity, Snyder’s syncretistic efforts seems to
suggest that each o f these particular m odes o f experiencing this u nity shares in a cross-cultural set of
epistem ological characteristics.
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Previous to this description, the ground of the Central Valley is described as “covered with /
cement culverts standing on end, / house-high & six feet wide / culvert after culvert far as
you can see” (65), all of which is said to be covered with a lengthy list of highways, houses,
farms and their accoutrements. This human collection of “stuff” covering the ground is
then, according to a quote by John Muir that Snyder appropriates, compared to the rich
diversity of flowers that used to cover the valley:
“The Great Central Plain of California
was one smooth bed of honey-bloom
400 miles, your foot would press
a hundred flowers at every step
it seemed one sheet of plant gold;
all the ground was covered
with radiant corollas ankle-deep:
bahia, madia, madaria, burielia,
chrysopsis, grindelia,
wherever a bee might fly—”
us and our stuff just covering the ground. (66-67)
Hum an objects are here portrayed as nature (flowers, in this instance), to be seen as placed
within time, within the process of change and decay: “yards of tractors, combines” are lined
up and viewed, “new bright-painted units down at one end, / old broke and smashed down
at the other” (65).
The experience of change or impermanence, often expressed in the form of narrative
travel in Snyder’s poetry, conveys an equivalency between physical and mental environments
that further negates the dualistic distinction between the interior (“self”) and the exterior
(“nature”). While cruising through the high-desert country of southeastern Oregon and
northeastern California, the speaker in “Finding the Space in the Heart” finds that the vast
physical emptiness of the region cannot be spoken of in dualistic terms. As the speaker
turns his truck into a desert landscape described as “know-not, / bone-gray dust boiling and
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billowing, / mile after mile, trackless and featureless” (150), he offers a soliloquy on the
physical emptiness surrounding him:
O ff nowhere, to be or not be,
all equal, far reaches, no bounds,
sound swallowed away,
no waters, no mountains, no
bush no grass and
because no grass
no shade but your shadow.
N o flatness because no not-flatness.
N o loss, no gain. So—
nothing in the way!
—the ground is the sky
the sky is the ground,
no place between, just
wind-whip breeze,
tent-mouth leeward,
time being here. (151)
The opening reference to Hamlet’s famous soliloquy indicates that the speaker finds himself
confronted with the challenge of whether he is “to be” or “not be.” In response to this
choice, the speaker begins to describe features that the desert landscape lacks—sound, water,
mountains, bush grass, shade—and then comes to a moment where he understands that
there is “N o flatness because no not-flatness.” As the speaker begins to see that without this
“flatness” (absence, bareness) there could be no concept of “not-flatness” (presence,
lushness, mountains, water), he comes to an awareness that “N o loss” equals “no gain”: one
must include the other. “To be” is therefore to “not be,” and to “not be” is “to be.” The
choice “to be” or “not be” is an illusion. There is only both, which is one.

When he

For the absence o f “not be” to exist there m ust be a “be,” o r presence. This sort o f logic is inform ed by the
follow in g threefold Buddhist discourse: First, m ountains are m ountains and waters are waters; second,
mountains are not m ountains and waters are not waters; third, mountains are really mountains and waters are
really waters. In this third stage the negation o f the negation is the absolute affirmation o f wholeness, because
to deny “m ountains are m ountains and rivers are rivers” for the affirmation of the emptiness of “mountains are
not m ountains and waters are not w aters” is to affirm a nonconstruction w ithou t the support o f the
construction. O n ce again, “form is emptiness; em ptiness is form ”—each phrase penetrates the other.
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grasps this concept, the speaker realizes that now there is “nothing in the way” of a nondualistic experience: “the ground is the sky / the sky is the ground, no place between.”
There is just “time being here,” which is another way of saying “forever-lost-in-eternityalways-present” (an experience of wholeness, seen through emptiness awareness). Within
this poem, the mind of emptiness is evoked as a manifestation of the desert landscape:
O, ah! The
awareness o f emptiness
brings forth a heart o f compassion! {MR WE 149)
In this phrase, which follows the speaker’s introductory description of himself driving
through high desert flats, the physical earth both expresses and is a state of mind. The
speaker likens the geological landscape to the Zen experience of emptiness. For the speaker,
the “emptiness” in the poem is both the physical emptiness of the landscape and the Zen
understanding of emptiness, in which an individual thinking with this “big” mind (free from
fixed ideas and subjective intentions) is free of the isolated concept of “self” and thus able to
“bring forth a heart of compassion.”^* Echoing the quoted phrase above, the first of two
epigraphs x.oMountains and Rivers Without End states, “The notion of Emptiness engenders
Compassion.” This Snyder-translated quote by Milarepa, an 1T^century Tibetan Buddhist,
indicates that the awareness of emptiness gives rise to the act of compassion, which is a
form of transcending the “self.”
A story in Robert Kapleau’s The Three Pillars o f Zen nicely illustrates the type of
awareness that gives rise to the transcending of “self.” According to the story, a group of

Im plicitly, com passion requires a renunciation o f the isolated self. The O xford English Dictionary defines
“com passion” as “sym pathetic p ity and concern for the sufferings o f others.” Interestingly, the w ord
“sym pathy” was originally a Greek astrological term used to describe the congruent relationship between the
physical alignm ent o f the heavens (as manifest in the stars) and the w orkings o f the human realm—a
relationship similar in character to the ancient fertility relationship believed to exist between humans and the
natural landscape.
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American university students, troubled by the apparent lack of ethical directives they found
in the Alan-Watts-influenced-and-defined-Zen, once asked Yasutani-roshi,
If [as] beat Zen has led us to believe satori [enlightenment realization of one’s
original nature] reveals the unreality of the past and future, is one not free to live as
one likes here and now, without reference to the past and without thought of the
future? (Kapleau 15)
In response to this question, Yasutani-roshi made a dot on the blackboard and explained
that this isolated dot represented their conception of “here and now.” To show the
incompleteness of this view, he placed another dot on the board, through which he drew a
horizontal line and a vertical one. He then explained that the horizontal line stood for time
from the beginningless past to the endless future and the vertical for limitless space. The
“present m om ent” of the enlightened man, who stands at this intersection, embraces all
these dimensions of time and space, he emphasized. Accordingly, the satori-realization that
one is the focus of past and future time and space unavoidably carries with it a sense of
fellowship and responsibility to one’s family and society as a whole, alike to those who will
follow one (Kapleau 15). This responsibility to society would of course include all humans
plus the society of all sentient beings, which includes all of nature. As such, the totalizing
sense of the universe that Zen espouses also requires a totalizing sense of selflessness.
Along this same line of thought, if one sees through emptiness, then it becomes
plausible that certain Buddhists would say a tree is in possession of Buddha-nature (the
potential to achieve enlightenment). For when humans attain an inner harmony, which is
the natural state of the universe, they become like the Buddha: perfectly in harmony with his
nature, which is our nature, which is nature.
In “Walking in the New York Bedrock / Alive in a Sea of Information” Snyder
continues to depict the human world of experience as if it is the world of nature. Here, the
city of New York is compared to various ecosystems of natural commerce, both underwater
59

and above water, present and past. Helicopters in this poem make their “long humming
trips / Trading pollen and nectar / In the air / of the / Sea of

Economy” {MRWE 99),

while subway graffiti is described as “Pictographs, / petroglyphs” (100), and buildings are
pictured as masters and gods of the city inhabitants (100,101). In the final stanzas of the
poem, an incisive depiction of economic inequality is also likened to a food chain:
Street people rolling their carts
O f whole households
O r asleep wrapped in light blue blanket
Spring evening, at dusk, in a doorway,
Eyeballing arêtes and buttresses rising above them.
Con domus, dominion,
Domus,
Condominate, condominium
Towers, up there the
Clean crisp white dress white skin
Women and men
W ho occupy sunnier niches.
Higher up on the layered stratigraphy cliffs, get
More photosynthesis, flow by more ostracods.
Get more sushi.
Gather more flesh, have delightful
Cascading laughs,
—Peregrine sails past the window
off the edge of the word-chain
harvesting concepts, theologies,
snapping up bites of the bits bred by
banking
ideas and wild speculations
on new information—
and stoops in a blur on a pigeon.
As the street bottom-feeders with shopping carts
Slowly check out the air for the fall of excess.
O f too much, flecks of extra.
From the higher-up folks in the sky
As the fine dusk gleam
Lights a whole glass side of
Forty some stories
Soft liquid silver.
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Beautiful buildings we float in, we feed in,
Foam, steel, gray
Alive in the Sea of information. (101-102)
In this passage, the wealthy apartment-dwellers occupy the top of the food-chain and
consume the largest amounts of energy (“get / More photosynthesis”), while the lower
classes “[sjlowly check out the air for the fall of excess, / of too much, flecks of extra.” The
comparison of the world of human actions to the natural world implies that the speaker of
the poem is looking at the world of humans from a biocentric and sociobiological position.^’
The ambiguous use of “as” to begin the third stanza also suggests that the bottom-feeding
lower classes are akin to the pigeon of the second stanza who is preyed upon by a peregrine
falcon that—to complete the flattening of the division between the human and the natural
worlds—is fed by human concepts, theologies, and banking ideas.
Here again, the human realm belongs to the natural realm. According to “Old
Woodrat’s Stinky House,”

Mountains and Rivers Without End, what a coyote

feeds on the coyote is. In this poem, a list of all the various animals and objects found in
5,086 coyote scats is defined as “Greater Yellowstone” (120). The coyote is thus a certain
reflection of his environment. It is therefore acceptable to say that, in this New York poem,
what the peregrine feeds on, the peregrine is, and to take it a step further, what a human

W ithin this poem , the m elting o f the hum an w orld in to the natural w orld, and the past historical and
anthropological into the present, is similar in technique to the “mythical m ethod” T.S. Eliot observed in Joyce’s
Ulysses and em ployed in The Waste L and w hen he com bined various world literatures, and historical facts into a
present text. Just as Eliot explicitly announces in one o f The Waste L and’s footnotes that the figure of Tiresias is
“the m ost im portant personage in the poem , uniting all the rest. [...] What Tiresias sees, in fact, is the substance
o f the p oem ” (Eliot 1837), so too m ay the reader o f Snyder’s poem infer that the trope of food chains, or more
accurately, ecological transfers o f energy through interconnected chains, is the central figure that Snyder uses to
integrate the various figures and aspects o f the poem . A lthough Snyder’s technique in this poem is similar in
technique to E liot’s “m ythical m ethod,” the lack o f authorial footnotes and heavy ironizing—as is prevalent in
The Waste L and—SiCX. to fortify this p oem ’s “intended m eaning” against m ore fractured or indeterminate
readings o f the text.
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feeds on that human is. So when this poem compares the humans “Who occupy sunnier
niches, / Higher up on the layered stratigraphy cliffs” to the peregrine falcon, the assertion is
that the natural (the peregrine, at the top of the food chain) is in fact the human (the
wealthy, at the top of the economic food-chain). In this poem, however, the use of the
terms “excess” and “too much” indicate that the wealthy, unlike the peregrine, are
consuming at a biologically inappropriate or unsustainable rate. But it is not only the
wealthy who are to blame for this inequality, since a human collectivity supports the
destructive economic system that is symbolized in the poem by the buildings already built
and those being constructed; notice also that the bottom-feeders—who are “whole
households” of the lower classes—are “asleep” at the base of the towers and are lethargically
“slow” to check the air for leftovers. Also, since the buildings that humans and the falcon
are able to “feed” on pidgeons, theologies, and banking ideas is deemed “the word-chain,”
the implication is that human language (“the word-chain”) acts as a set of structures that
perpetuates the economic food-chain or hierarchy. As one of the final lines of this poem
elaborates, it is the buildings that ultimately contain us and our activity: “Beautiful buildings
we float in, we feed in” (102). Like “The Hump-backed Flute Player,” and like the entire
project oi Mountains and Rivers Without End, “Walking in the New York Bedrock / Alive in a
Sea of Information” points to the exterior world of nature in order that we see nature as a
process, which is our human process.
In the epigraph to Mountains and Rivers Without End, Dôgen’s comments on the
“Painting of a Rice Cake” express this non-dualistic awareness by denying the division
between the human representation of the thing (the world of humans) and the thing-itself
(the natural world):
An ancient Buddha said “A painted rice cake does not satisfy hunger.” Dogen
comments:
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“There are few who have even seen this ‘painting of a rice cake’ and none have of
them has thoroughly understood it.
“The paints for painting rice-cakes are the same as those used for painting mountains
and waters.
“If you say the painting is not real, then the material phenomenal world is not real,
the Dharma is not real.
“Unsurpassed enlightenment is a painting. The entire phenomenal universe and the
empty sky are nothing but a painting.
“Since this is so, there is no remedy for satisfying hunger other than a painted rice
cake. W ithout painted hunger you never become a true person.” {viv)
Like a raindrop or a blade of grass or rice, the painting of a rice cake is you, is me, is “the
nature of the nature of nature,” “the wild,” and/or “thusness.” To say that a painting of a
rice cake does not satisfy hunger is to say that the painting of the rice cake is less real than
the rice cake itself, thereby constructing a dualism of “real” and “non-real.” The paints used
in the painting of a rice cake are made of the same elemental materials as the rice cake itself,
just as the mountains and waters and paintings of mountains and waters are made up of the
same elemental materials as humans, and all these materials (phenomena), in whatever
combinations they manifest themselves, are expressions of impermanence. Enlightenment
reveals that the painting of a rice cake is the entire phenomenal universe, of which humans
are both part and all. Until an awareness that the painting of a rice cake is the entire
phenomenal universe, there is no remedy for satisfying hunger, which is desire: the source of
all suffering, according to Buddhism. Non-dualistically, there is no such thing as real or nonreal, “natural” or “artificial.” Without painted rice cakes how could one ever satisfy hunger,
satisfy non-hunger, not satisfy hunger, and not satisfy non-hunger? The entire phenomenal
universe is thus a painted rice cake, just as the entire phenomenal universe is the rice cake
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itself. A ny object or non-object could be substituted for the painting of the rice cake—it
does not make any difference—as any element stands for the Dharma.
In this same manner, the entire phenomenal universe is Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers
Without End: a “representation” of the identically-titled Chinese landscape scroll, which is
itself a representation of “real” mountains and rivers, which are themselves traditionally “a
way to refer to the totality of the process of nature” {pW 102). Snyder’s Mountains and Rivers
Without End is therefore like a grain of rice, a drop of rain, or blade of rice.
Speaking about such a moment of unity, Snyder remembers giving up an intellectual
life that was separate from his physical work:
By just working, I found myself being completely there, having the whole mountain
inside of me, and finally having a whole language inside of me that became one with
the rocks and with the trees. And that was where I first learned the possibility of
being one with what you were doing, and not losing anything in the mind thereby.

As a practicing Zen Buddhist, Snyder understands that the-construction-of-his-poem-is hiswork-is-his-whole-life-is-all. To think of artistic or intellectual practice as separate from the
rest of his life, or to think of a representation of the thing as separate from the thing itself, is
to construct an illusory dualism of this and that.
Snyder’s poetry often denies such dualisms by acting, in the ecocritic Leonard
Scigaj’s playful words, as a poetry of référance, since it makes the reader aware of the limits of
language’s self-reflexivity, while simultaneously referring his or her perceptions beyond the
printed page to nature, the referential origin of language (38). The poetry of référance, Scigaj
continues, is always seeking to make the reader aware of his or her relation to what is outside
language, and it often attempts to bring the reader into moments of atonement or at-onement with nature (38). It is a poetics of nature, says Scigaj, that seems to find its keenest
expression in Snyder’s active interplay between the lived body and the sentient environment
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(232). Even beyond Scigaj's dualistic notions, language and nature and humans are not
divisible in any fundamental sense as far as Snyder is concerned; they are all expressions of
wildness or “thusness.”
Snyder’s own term for his artistic project is not the poetry of référance but the “art of
the wild,” which he describes as,
[...] art in the context of the process of nature—nature as process rather than as
product or commodity—because “wild” is a name for the way phenomena
continually actualize themselves. {GSR 260)
The above is clearly a statement of artistic purpose, fundamentally shaped by the nondualistic teachings of dharma (phenomena) and impermanence. Snyder’s “art of the wild”
consists not merely of his books of poetry, but also includes the act of creating poems and
the reading of and commentary on those poems; they are all one. According to Scigaj’s take
on Dôgen’s comments on the “Painting of a Rice Cake,” “The labor of artistic creation
through words is just another of the many ways that one can realize enlightenment. It is
inseparable from everyday practice” (263). Within Snyder’s radically integrated Zen vision,
the act of reading Mountains and Rivers Without End, like the act of his writing it, is to be
experienced as another of the many ways that one can realize enlightenment. With this in
mind, Snyder can, without seeming egoistic, claim to think oi Mountains and Rivers Without
E n d —diS he

does in the poem’s epilogue—“as a sort of sutra” (158).

This totalizing Buddhist perspective can be seen in the way that temporal and spatial
realities are separated from their everyday conceptions m Mountains and Rivers Without End.
In the poem “Journeys,” for instance, various sections are dreams, while other sections
represent the speaker’s historical memory. The distinction between dream and historical
memory becomes increasingly difficult to discern, since the poem represents both dream and
memory as journeys, and the switching to and from dream stanza and historical stanza
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indicates that dream is analogous to historical memory and vice versa. In the final stanza of
the poem, the speaker is interlinked to another figure named “Ko”—a term which, Patrick
Murphy points out, happens to be the Indo-European root for “together,” and which might
also represent the Hopi figure of Kokop’ele {Understanding 73). The end of “Journeys” also
describes the speaker and Ko melting into one another through a metaphoric death:
Ko-san and I stood on a point by a cliff, over a
Rock-walled canyon. Ko said, “N ow we have come to
Where we die.” I asked him—w hat’s that up there.
Then—meaning the further mountains.
“That’s the world of after death.” I thought it looked
just like the land we’d been traveling, and couldn’t
see why we should have to die.
Ko grabbed me and pulled me over the cliff—
Both of us falling. I hit and I was dead. I saw
My body for a while, then it was gone.
Ko was there too. We were at the bottom of the gorge.
We started drifting up the canyon. “This is the
Way to the back country.” {MRWE 55)
In the final lines of this poem, the mountains ahead are associated with death and the future.
They also appear to the speaker just like the mountains he had already passed through. This
gesture indicates that the difference between past and future no longer makes sense to the
speaker. H e wonders why he should have to die, which is also a manner of wondering how
death is distinct from life and how the future is distinct from the present. The speaker must
metaphorically die, however, in order to grasp that as time is indivisible so too is space
indivisible. As the speaker’s body departs him, the narration switches from the ego-driven
“I” to egoless “We,” which now includes Ko. This shedding of the ego is depicted as “the /
Way to the back country.” This statement indicates that the denial of linear conceptions of
time and isolated categories of “self” (space) is a Way (Tao) to a wild backcountry of both
the mind and the physical landscape, since, within “the wild,” the mind is the physical
landscape.
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As a further example of Snyder’s disassembling structural techniques, the phrase
“Clearing the mind and sliding in / to that created space” in the poem “Endless Streams and
Mountains” is allusion to emptiness awareness {MRWE 5). Because this phrase seems to
have no clear referent, the reader, as well as the speaker of the poem, is pulled into the
action, or non-action as it were. In this poem, emptiness is also associated with the “broad
white space” of the calligraphy paper that the author is about to fill in with his brush (9).
Both the “created space” of the mind and the “broad white space” of the calligraphy paper
are free of habits, subjective intentions, conceptions, and fixed ideas, yet the speaker tells us
at the end of the poem that he is about to fill the “broad white space” with his brush and
ink—a move that would seem to symbolize the creation of categories, names, and concepts
through the use o f language. But as D ôgen’s commentary on the “Painting o f a Rice Cake”

reminds us, to think of the language or the artistic process as separate from who we are is to
construct a divisive dualism; therefore, what at first appears to be the construction of
categories, names, and concepts by the use of language in fact represents the stripping away
of these same fixed ideas by way of language that points to a holistic and non-dualistic

vision.
In a culmination of Snyder’s radically integrated approach to language, artistic
expression, and the processes of nature, the final lines oi Mountains and R ivers Without End
depict the author’s moist calligraphy brush lifting away from the paper as the work ends,
while the open space of the page continues:
Walking on walking,
underfoot earth turns
Streams and mountains never stay the same.
The space goes on.
But the wet black brush
tip drawn to a point.
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lifts away. (152)
l^\iemdîntr3^kies“Walkingonwdking,/underfoot earthturm/Strmmsandmmntainsneverstay
the same” appear at the end of this final poem just as they did at the end of the first poem in
Mountains and Rivers Without End. This repetition highhghts beginnings and endings as part of
the process of impermanence, and the repeated use of “walking” in this passage stresses that
the human and the natural are describable in the same terms of process, impermanence
(notice the verbal construction). The juxtaposition of the line “underfoot earth turns”with
the previous line suggests that the second use of “walking” is a reference to the geological
and celestial movement of the earth. The lines “The space goes on. / But the wet black
brush / tip drawn to a point, / lifts away,” juxtaposed to the line that precedes them,
indicate that the geological processes of the earth are congruent to the way in which
language functions. The human actions of the speaker are therefore no different that the
actions of the earth. In these final lines, the human action represented is the construction of
language. The author’s calligraphy brush will no longer re-shape and re-mold language, yet
this space, which represents Zen emptiness, “goes on”; our original nature, which is seen
through emptiness awareness, “goes on” even though the language Snyder uses to represent
it may not. That “The space goes on,” even though Snyder’s brush and ink may not, stresses
the reality of impermanence as well as the notion that at a deep level language, as part of wild
nature, represents “unconditioned mind-in-the-moments” rather than abstracted
constructions of the world we often perceive language to re-present; language is tied to
experience and cannot be separated from it. According to Leonard Scigaj’s commentary on
this passage.
Text and practice are inseparable, and Snyder’s “moist black line” dispels the late
capitalist illusion that signifiers are unattached commodities, Baudrillardian
simulacras of surfaces mechanically reproduced [...] in ways that insulate us within
language games of aesthetic appreciation. Snyder implies that the aesthetic
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appreciation of the “moist black line” is inseparable from the labor of experience in
the everyday that evolved the perceptions that motivated, guided, and enacted the
process of artistic composition.” {Sustainable 263)
If we were to go a bit further than Scigaj and add to Snyder’s experience of constructing this
long poem the larger experience of existence, it would seem ihzl Mountains and Rivers Without
End uses the semaphore of language to point away from the self-contained approach to
language—one that posits it as a pure mental construction, devoid of natural origin—toward
the larger process of nature, in which humans and language are inextricably interwoven.
Like each word within its web, the system of language is similar to a blade of rice or a
painting of a rice cake—it is an emblem for all of existence.
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IX.

THE POLITICS OF SNYDER’S ECO-BUDDHISM
W orld view s, like the genes o f their carriers, are tested in the
crucible o f natural selection. T h ey m ay help or hinder their
subscribers in the business o f life, and, thus, m ay them selves
spread or shrink in influence. W orld view s grow and change in
response to success and failure in praxis, or calcify and die.
J Baird C allicott and R oget T. A m es, N ature in A sian Traditions o f Thought

[IJndustrial/technological civilization is really on the w rong
track, because its drive and energy are purely m echanical and
self-serving—re<«/ values are som eplace else. T he real values are
w ithin nature, family, mind, and into liberation [...] A nd how do
w e m ake the choices in our national econom ic p olicy that take
into account that kind o f cost accounting—that ask, “What is the
natural-spiritual price w e pay for this particular piece of
affluence, com fort, pleasure, or labor saving?" [...] T here’s an
accounting that no one has figured out h o w to do.
Gary Snyder, 1977 East West in terview w ith Peter Barry Chowka

Although Gary Snyder may be best known for his poetry and prose, his public
performances and lectures have also established him as an influential environmental and
political thinker. In his later years, Snyder has become increasingly political in his efforts to
^^'a^c^hange, and he holds that his political worldview is the pragmatic aspect of his art, in
the sense that he feels that there is really no separation between politics and art; his art is his
politics and his politics of art is an ecological vision, wherein his “political position is to be a
spokesman for wild nature” {R W 49). Snyder also feels that his work is in line with the hig
flow of things, which is to say he understands that over huge scales of time “all human
activity is as trivial as anything else [on this planet]” (Martin 161). Humans, within this
vision, aren’t separate from or superior to animate and inanimate nature, but are rather
governed by a Buddhist conception of essential nature, which is another name for original
nature. To re-quote Snyder,
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For those who would see directly into essential nature, the idea of the sacred is a
delusion and an obstruction: it diverts us from seeing what is before our eyes: plain
thusness. Roots, stems, and branches are all equally scratchy. N o hierarchies, no
equality. N o occult and exoteric, no gifted kids and slow achievers [...] no natural or
artificial. (PITIOS)
In effect, Snyder’s politics of art is based on extinguishing illusory constructions of “self” as
distinct from “nature” and other human “selfs.” This politics of art is also based on the
continual dismantling of these philosophically-influenced constructions that get
institutionalized in the form of dominant ideologies, and which keep humans away from
original nature, which is nature. This radically-integrated politics of art is founded on a view
that human political systems require “self-government” {GSR 338), which would then
require the active participation of all sentient beings, because the “self” is understood to be
all of existence. And as I have previously mentioned, Snyder has claimed that the poet’s
role, like the shaman’s, is to act as “an early warning system that hears the trees and the air
and the clouds and the watersheds beginning to groan and complain” {RW 7\). Such a
sentiment indicates that rocks and trees do in fact have a voice that can be heard and added
to the political discussion; however, this outlook requires the active participation of all
sentient beings (rocks and trees included), and seems to espouse a move toward
decentralized or at least more locally-representative forms of government that make
decisions with the local environment in mind as a primary concern.'*^ In contrast to this
move, the world appears to be moving toward increasingly centralized forms of human
organization.
Primarily as a result of the sheer violence of this last century, along with the
construction of weapons of mass destruction, and the spread of a global capitalistic

Snyder has been a leading advocate for bioregionalism , a term that suggests hum an activities should be
constrained by ecological and geographical boundaries rather than political ones.
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marketplace, the establishment of international coalitions and other bureaucratic governing
bodies (i.e. the W orld Bank, the IMF, the W TO, and the United Nations) has come to
dominate current conversations regarding social organization. Each of these centralized
coalitions and governing bodies appeals to universalistic values such as justice, equality, and
fairness, in their efforts to foster and promote political and economic stability among nation
states. Unfortunately, the democratic ideology behind these universals has tended to act as
thin camouflage for the various oligarchies and pressure groups that internally manipulate
these organizations for political and economic advantage, and, as a result, widespread dissent
has been voiced by those groups and nation-states that have been variously disempowered.
Also, the very act of relying upon universals to establish the rule of law cuts against the grain
of post-structuralists who feel that the values of universalism have always led to forms of
oppression, both to humans and to our natural environment.
Snyder, in contrast to the move toward highly bureaucratic and centralized systems
of rule based on universals, describes himself as an anarchist, in the sense that he defines
anarchism as the “creation of nonstatist, natural societies as contrasted with legalistically
organized societies, as alternative models for human organization” (GSR 337). The only
universal Snyder seems to espouse is his integrated worldview, which is structured by a Zen
Buddhist framework that does not require moral universals.'*'
For all his political activism, however, Snyder has strangely never advocated a
totalizing political platform or a universal program of social change. As he says, he has

“•I The w ord “m oral” implies notions o f right and wrong and therein invokes a dualism that Buddhism does not
recognize. From an interrelated perspective, participation in original nature informs one that he or she is all of
existence, and conversely, all o f existence is him or her, so there is no need to apply any other universal than
the truth o f original nature to all things, since one w h o participates in his or her original nature, w hich is
“nature,” realizes that each giving act is a selfish act and each selfish act is in fact a giving act: the act of
generosity. T o act in o n e’s original nature is, therefore, to act for the benefit o f oneself and all others
(including “nature”).
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always been “cautious about proposing [political] programs” because he is not sure that
“deliberately applied drastic changes will necessarily get you to where you want to go”
(Martin 160). Instead, Snyder’s prose and poetry seem to suggest that a change in
fundamental modes of Being, or what he calls “myth-block ideas” (i?W^72), is a better
method with which to approach unsound social structures than is the promotion of an active
political program. Yet, from a practical perspective, Snyder’s long-range vision seems to
offer no present program for structuring a world of increasingly interdependent economies,
where weapons of mass destruction are a tangible threat.
Although the world might eventually be better off if everyone shared Snyder’s
worldview and acted according to his vision, this seems an unlikely and impractical end,
given the radical nature of his project. As a pragmatist, which Snyder claims he is, the effort
to convert the hundredth monkey to his perspective seems a task with no clear end in
sight—and this may very well be the way Snyder envisions his effort (as framed within glacial
scales of time)—since his worldview is set against a rapidly spreading Western capitalistic
and industrial/technological system (read “globalization”) whose destructive core values of
enlightened self-interest and anthropocentrism largely structure contemporary political
discourses.'*^ The difference between Snyder’s worldview and globalization’s present
worldview appears to be one of emphasis. In Snyder’s eco-Buddhist vision, working for the
good of the planet works for one because he is the planet, while from the general globalized
perspective, working for one’s own good is good for one’s country, all countries, and the
planet. Clearly, placing initial emphasis on the long-range good of the planet versus placing

'*^ Just as C allicott and A m es have claim ed that the adoption o f ‘m odern’ technologies by the East has been
nothing less than an adoption o f the dom inant W estern paradigm, so to o does the adoption o f a Westernized
capitalistic and industrial-technological system include the adoption o f its intrinsic values o f enlightened selfinterest, anthropocentrism , and com m od ity fetishism .
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initial emphasis on the short-term good of the individual has dramatic practical
consequences, yet a global shift of this sort would require—at the bare minimum—a
fundamental overhaul or overthrow of the current economic and political models and their
intrinsic core values.
Although the postmodern era, in which Snyder and his eco-Buddhist approach are
primarily ensconced, has ushered in a greater respect for diversity of opinion and lifestyle, at
the same time, globalization has sped in the reverse—it has increasingly homogenized both
the developed and underdeveloped worlds into its paradigms, which many consider to be
unstable and damaging. And for the past few decades, a growing critical movement has
organized against the tide of this global movement. Snyder, as a critic of Western
capitalistic, industrial/technological civilization, has been an important voice in this
movement, yet, his role as cultural dissenter—like that of many other postmodern, anti
globalization critics and theorists—has remained rather peripheral, largely due to his
unwillingness to translate his eco-Buddhist vision into a feasible model for human
organization. Should Snyder continue to desire to translate his eco-Buddhist beliefs into the
political world, it is likely that he will need to frame them into a practical model of
organization—maybe in something along the lines of E.F. Schumacher’s Small is Beautiful—
or it is probable that his project will speak to an audience abstracted from the concrete
threats of the prevailing global model.
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